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7TH. INF. DIV. ARTY.

ICEBERG
OPERATION REPORT

1 APRIL 1945

TO:

30 JUNE 1945

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by _____

E. S. JOHNSTON
Colonel, Infantry
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14. ABSTRACT The report is a chronological narrative of events pertaining to the 7th Infantry Division Artillery immediately prior to and during the RYUKUS Campaign, compiled for historical purposes, and includes comments, recommendations, and records deemed to be of value to other units participating in similar operations. The 7th Infantry Division Artillery was assigned the mission of providing artillery support to the 7th Infantry Division in destroying and defeating all hostile forces encountered in the assigned zone of action on the Island of Okinawa.								
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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
A.P.O. #7, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

REPORT OF RYUKYUS CAMPAIGN
(ICEBERG OPERATION)

1 APRIL 1945 ---- 30 JUNE 1945

JUN 21 1964

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By

E. S. JOHNSTON
Colonel, Infantry
GUSTON

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REPORT OF RYUKYUS CAMPAIGN

(ICEBERG OPERATION)

1 APRIL 1945 ---- 30 JUNE 1945

I. GENERAL NATURE AND PURPOSE OF REPORT.

The following report is a chronological narrative of events pertaining to the 7th Infantry Division Artillery immediately prior to and during the RYUKYUS Campaign, compiled for historical purposes, and includes comments, recommendations, and records deemed to be of value to other units participating in similar operations.

The 7th Infantry Division Artillery was assigned the mission of providing Artillery support to the 7th Infantry Division in destroying and defeating all hostile forces encountered in the assigned zone of action on the Island of OKINAWA.

II. COMPOSITION OF 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY.

7th Inf Div Arty.....	BRIG GEN L. J. STEWART
Hq & Hq Btry, 7th Inf Div Arty....	FLT GUSS E. WILLIAMS
31st FA Bn (155mm How).....	MAJOR STUART M. GEORGE
48th FA Bn (105mm How).....	LT COL C. B. E. HARTS
49th FA Bn (105mm How).....	LT COL FRANCIS B. HARRISON
57th FA Bn (105mm How).....	LT COL DONALD F. SLAUGHTER

III. PRELIMINARY PLANNING.

On receipt of tentative plans for the RYUKYUS Operation, a War Plans building was established in the Div CP area. All data, including maps, were assembled at the War Plans building for study. The 7th Div Arty Cmdr held conferences in the War Plans building with his staff and all Bn Cmdrs and their staffs. These conferences included attached units capable of providing Arty fire support.

IV. TRAINING PHASE AND REHEARSAL.

No special amphibious training was conducted between the KING II (LEYTE Island) Operation and the RYUKYUS Campaign.

The 31st Bn was converted from a 105mm Howitzer Bn to a 155mm Howitzer Bn in the period between the LYTE Campaign and the RYUKYUS Campaign. No special training was conducted as this Bn had previously trained with the 155mm Howitzer, also available time did not permit.

All Howitzers of the 7th Div Arty were calibrated and regrouped prior to departure from LYTE.

Arty personnel was placed with the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion and intensive training in indirect fire methods was conducted.

One (1) ten (10) day school was conducted for selected personnel in the maintenance and operation of the Snooper-Sniper Scopes.

One (1) short course was conducted for selected personnel in the maintenance and operation of bulldozers.

One (1) lecture was given to personnel concerned in the care and use of the VT Fuze.

Conferences were held for all organic and attached units and instruction was given on communication nets peculiar to this operation.

Rehearsals were held on the Island of LEYTE, but from the Arty, only FO and In Parties with Inf elements participated. All radio nets were checked during the rehearsal period.

V. LOADING.

a. Organization for loading on the Island of LEYTE.

- (1) The Div Arty of the 7th Inf Div organized and operated the Div LST Loading Point for the loading of all LSTs and LSMs. The 7th Div Arty was responsible for loading the light Bns aboard three (3) LSTs, the medium Bn aboard one (1) APA, one (1) LSM, and three (3) AKAs. In addition, nine (9) supply LSTs and three (3) Engr LSTs were loaded.
- (2) The 7th Div Arty S-4 coordinated all activities connected with the LST Loading Point and maintained In between Div supply agencies, representatives of AC of S, G-4, and the FA Bns.
- (3) The Div Arty Asst S-1 was Ammunition Officer for 7th Div Arty. He was responsible for establishing an ammunition dump at which all ammunition was sorted by lot number into separate piles and plainly marked with a distinctive symbol so each type and lot number could be readily identified in the field. Most of the 155mm ammunition was repainted and grommets replaced to protect the rotating bands. All 155mm ammunition, including propelling charges and fuzes, was palletized. The 7th Div Arty Ammunition Officer issued the ammunition so each Bn received all of one (1) lot number.
- (4) A Div Arty control point was established at the LST loading point. The control point was organized with a senior control officer in overall charge, three (3) assistant control officers who remained on duty eight (8) hours per day. The control officers, assisted by suitable non-commissioned officers, regulated and controlled the movement of all supplies into and out of their stock piles. A cargo checker kept an accurate record of all supplies loaded into trucks. When a truck was loaded, the cargo checker handed the driver a tallyout which the driver surrendered to a cargo checker at the ship who counted the supplies as they were unloaded and returned the tallyout to the control officer, thereby enabling him to keep an accurate record of the supplies loaded aboard each ship.

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(5) The best qualified officer available in the 7th Div Arty was selected as the Div Arty TQM who worked in conjunction with the Arty Bn TQMs. The 7th Div Arty TQM supervised the works of the Bn TQMs and advised them on the loading of each ship.

(6) A TQM was assigned to each ship. In general, the Arty TQMs were carefully selected for this duty and were ably assisted by non-commissioned officers who, in some cases, were more qualified to plan and supervise the loading than the officers. The TQMs for the supply LSTs were selected from the lowest rank available for this duty and were not too satisfactory. Some of the officers selected for this important duty were inexperienced, their plans were incomplete, sketchy, impractical, and they did not have the ability to supervise the loading of their ships. This resulted in the Arty Bn taking over the job of the TQM selected in order to get the LST loaded on time.

(7) One (1) Btry of the medium Bn was loaded on an LSM together with half a unit of fire of 155mm Howitzer ammunition. The remainder of the Bn was loaded on an APA with ammunition loaded on three (3) AKAs and one (1) APA.

(8) Each Bn Cmdr was responsible that the ships loaded by his Bn were loaded properly and on time.

(9) Because the LSTs did not arrive at the time planned, the personnel of 7th Div Arty did not embark for the rehearsal but remained behind to load Engr equipment on three (3) LSTs. Certain selected personnel was loaded aboard the three (3) Arty LSTs with the Bn Cmdr as Troop Cmdr. The Btry Executive Officer of the medium Btry loaded in the LSM was the Troop Cmdr. The remaining personnel was loaded aboard an APA with the 7th Div Arty Executive as the Troop Cmdr. The CG, 7th Div Arty, with one (1) Aide, one (1) orderly, two (2) radio operators, and one (1) operations sergeant, embarked aboard the Div Command Ship.

(10) Each light Bn loaded nine hundred thirty (930) short tons of equipment and supplies on each Arty LST which required 2900 man hours for loading. It was estimated that each Bn performed 2350 man hours of work at the supply dumps of the LST control point.

b. Obstacles overcome in loading.

(1) Most of the LSTs to be loaded returned from IWO JIMA filled with debris and behind schedule, which delayed the time in loading as time was lost in cleaning them out.

(2) Some of the LSTs carried 5" Navy ammunition which had to be re-loaded in order that all the vehicles, Howitzers, combat organization equipment, supplies, and five (5) units of ammunition could be loaded.

(3) The piers built by the Engrs were not substantial enough to withstand the heavy surf and were further wrecked by the LSTs coming in to dock in the wind and surf. Time was lost due to difficulty of the LST beaching at the piers.

(4) Inexperienced TQMs were responsible for delaying the loading of supply LSTs.

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(5) The heavy surf increased the difficulty of loading small boats which at times could not be used because of the danger of being swamped.

(6) Several "Red Alerts" at night delayed the loading due to the necessity of extinguishing all lights.

c. Supplies carried in assault shipping.

(1) Class I.

(a) An initial supply of four (4) gallons of water per man was carried in five (5) gallon cans.

(b) The following rations were carried with the troops:

2 D Rations	Ration Accessories
2 K Rations	Coffee Component
1 Assault Ration (Candy)	Salt Tablets
2 10-in-1 Rations	Atabrine

(2) Class II.

(a) Standard cleaning and preserving kits with essential cleaning and preserving materials for fifteen (15) days were loaded aboard each ship. The Quartermaster kit contained cleaning and preserving materials on the basis of two hundred (200) men per kit for three (3) days. The Ordnance kit contained cleaning and preserving materials on the basis of two hundred (200) men per kit for five (5) days.

(b) Three (3) days supply of radio batteries and wire were carried with organizational property.

(c) Tentage in assault shipping was limited to that used for CPs, Comm Centers, Medical Installations, Kitchens, and Latrines.

(3) Class III.

(a) Each vehicle was loaded with tanks three fourths (3/4) full of fuel.

(b) Each Arty Bn carried the following amounts of fuel and lubricants in assault shipping:

Diesel Fuel, 50 Octane	735 gallons
Gasoline, 80 Octane	1,490 gallons
Gasoline, 67 Octane (unleaded)	220 gallons
Gasoline, 73 Octane (Av)	2,400 gallons
Airplane Lubricants	20 pounds
Oil, SAE #10	5 gallons
Oil, SAE #30	50 gallons
Oil, SAE #50	50 gallons
Grease, GO #90	50 gallons
Grease, GP #1	50 pounds
Grease, GP #2	50 pounds

(4) Class IV.

(a) Construction material for flyproof kitchens and latrines was taken.

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(b) Each Arty Bn carried a limited supply of Engr explosives.

(5) Class V.

(a) One (1) unit of small arms ammunition for all weapons was taken.

(b) Fifty (50) flares per Bn and 7th Div Arty Hq Btry were taken.

(c) Each Bn loaded five (5) units of 105mm ammunition with each 105mm Howitzer, 0.5 units of 155mm ammunition with each 155mm Howitzer, and 4.5 units of 155mm ammunition in three (3) AKAs. All 155mm ammunition, except that loaded on the LSM, was palletized.

1. Unit of fire for 105mm Howitzer:

130 rounds with fuze M-48
85 rounds with fuze M-54
30 rounds WP with fuze M-57

250 rounds total.

2. Unit of fire for 155mm Howitzer:

105 rounds with fuze M-51-A3
30 rounds with fuze M-55-A1
15 rounds WP with fuze M-110

150 rounds total.

3. Propelling charges for 155mm Howitzers:

105 white bag.
45 green bag.

4. Fifth (50) T-105 (concrete piercing) fuzes were carried per Howitzer, and four (4) rounds of canister were carried per 105mm Howitzer.

(6) Miscellaneous Supplies.

(a) Unessential items of organizational property, vehicles, officers footlockers, were left behind on LEYTE with a rear echelon which was scheduled to arrive at the target when shipping became available.

(b) Fifty (50) DUKWs were secured from the 472nd DUKW Co and assigned to the 7th Div Arty. These DUKWs were to revert to the 472nd DUKW Co when they were no longer needed.

(c) The L-4 Ln Planes were loaded by the light Bns in long wheel base 2½-ton trucks which were placed on the weather deck of the respective LSTs. The medium Bn loaded two (2) L-4 Ln Planes on a "Brodie" LSM. The two (2) L-5 Ln Planes of the 7th Div Arty/Air Section were to be carried aboard a Navy Escort Carrier.

(d) LOADING CHART FOR THE DIVISION ARTILLERY OF THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION.

1. List of vehicles brought in assault shipping:

:HQ & HQ BTRY: 31ST: 48TH: 49TH: 57TH: TOTAL FOR:
 : DIV ARTY :FA BN:FA BN:FA BN:FA BN: DIV ARTY;

Truck, 1/4 Ton 4 x 4.	10	10	16	20	19	75
Truck, 3/4 Ton 4 x 4 W/C.	4	6	6	6	6	28
Truck, 1-1/2 Ton 6 x 6.	2	5	2	3	3	15
Truck, 2-1/2 Ton 6 x 6 SWB.	2	7	7	6	6	28
Truck, 2-1/2 Ton 6 x 6 LWB.	1	2	10	10	10	33
Tractor, High Speed M-5.	0	15	6	6	6	33
Tractor, D-7 w/dozer.	0	3	3	3	3	12
Carrier, Cargo M-29-C.	4	6	6	6	6	28
Wrecker, 4 Ton.	0	1	0	0	0	1
Trucks, 2-1/2 Ton Amph DUKW*	2	3	15	15	15	50
TOTAL	25	58	71	75	74	303

Trailer, 1/4 Ton.	4	5	5	4	7	25
Trailer, 1 Ton.	3	0	2	4	5	14
Trailer, M-10.	0	14	4	4	4	26
TOTAL	7	19	11	12	16	65

*Note: All trucks, 2-1/2-Ton Amph DUKW, were returned to the 472nd DUKW Co when they were no longer needed for unloading the Arty LSTs.

2. List of vehicles brought in other echelons of shipping:

:HQ & HQ BTRY: 31ST: 48TH: 49TH: 57TH: TOTAL FOR:
 : DIV ARTY :FA BN:FA BN:FA BN:FA BN: DIV ARTY;

Truck, 1/4 Ton 4 x 4.	1	5	3	1	2	12
Truck, 3/4 Ton 4 x 4 W/C.	0	0	1	1	0	2
Truck, 2-1/2 Ton 6 x 6 SWB.	1	0	5	8	8	22
Truck, 2-1/2 Ton 6 x 6 LWB.	0	9	2	2	2	15
Truck, 2-1/2 Ton Amph DUKW.	1	6	7	7	6	27
Truck, 4 Ton 6 x 6.	0	1	0	0	0	1
Tractor High Speed M-5.	0	5	6	1	1	13
TOTAL	3	26	24	20	19	92

Trailer, 1/4 Ton.	0	3	4	5	4	16
Trailer, 1 Ton.	0	8	5	4	3	20
Trailer, M-10.	0	10	8	8	8	34
TOTAL	0	21	17	17	15	70

3. Loading Chart of Vehicles, Howitzers, and Planes:

HQ & HQ BTRY DIV ARTY	APA 155	LST 27	LST 760	APA 51	AKA 80	TOTAL
Truck, 1/4 Ton 4 x 4.	10	0	0	0	0	10
Truck, 3/4 Ton 4 x 4 WC.	4	0	0	0	0	4
Truck, 1-1/2 Ton 6 x 6.	1	0	0	1	0	2
Truck, 2-1/2 Ton 6 x 6 SWB.	0	0	1	0	1	2
Truck, 2-1/2 Ton 6 x 6 LWB.	1	0	0	0	0	1
Carrier, Cargo M-29-C.	4	0	0	0	0	4
Truck, 2-1/2 Ton Amph DUKW.	1	1	0	0	0	2
TOTAL	21	1	1	1	1	25
Trailer, 1/4 Ton.	4	0	0	0	0	4
Trailer, 1 Ton.	3	0	0	0	0	3
TOTAL	7	0	0	0	0	7

Note: Air Section of 7th Div Arty Hq was to load two (2) L-5 planes abroad a Navy Carrier. Just before sailing the Navy refused to load the two (2) planes and the planes had to be transported in later echelons of shipping.

31ST F.A. BN.	APA: 155:	LSM: 26:	LST: 16:	LST: 22:	LST: 28:	LST: 29:	LST: 760:	AKA: 80:	APA: 2:	TOTAL:
Truck, 1/4 Ton 4 x 4.	5	2	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	10
Truck, 3/4 Ton 4 x 4 WC.	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	6
Truck, 1-1/2 Ton 6 x 6.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	5
Truck, 2-1/2 Ton 6 x 6 SWB.	0	2	0	4	0	0	0	1	0	7
Truck, 2-1/2 Ton 6 x 6 LWB.	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
Tractor, High Speed M-5.	8	4	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	15
Tractor, D-7 w/dozer.	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Carrier Cargo M-29-C.	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Wrecker, 4 Ton.	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Trucks, 2-1/2 Ton Amph DUKW.	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	3
TOTAL	23	12	3	4	1	2	5	7	1	58
Trailer, 1/4 Ton.	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	5
Trailer, M-10.	10	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
Howitzer, 155mm.	8	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12
TOTAL	22	6	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	31

Note: 31st Bn loaded two (2) L-4 planes on "Brodie" LST.

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48TH F.A. BN.	APA: LST: LST: LST: LST: AKA:							TOTAL :
	155:	27:	11:	18:	20:	930:	80:	
Truck, 1/4 Ton 4 x 4.	3	2	5	6	0	0	0	16
Truck, 3/4 Ton 4 x 4 WC.	0	0	0	0	4	0	2	6
Truck, 1-1/2 Ton 6 x 6.	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Truck, 2-1/2 Ton 6 x 6 SWB.	0	1	0	4	0	2	0	7
Truck, 2-1/2 Ton 6 x 6 LWB.	0	2	5	3	0	0	0	10
Tractor, High Speed M-5.	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	6
Tractor, D-7 w/dozer.	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
Carrier Cargo M-29-C.	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
Trucks, 2-1/2 Ton Amph DUKW.	0	15	0	0	0	0	0	15

TOTAL 3 34 10 13 4 2 2 68

Trailer, 1/4 Ton.	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	5
Trailer, 1 Ton.	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Trailer M-10.	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
Howitzer, 105mm.	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	12
Planes, L-4.	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2

TOTAL 3 18 0 4 0 0 0 25

Note: 48th Bn loaded three (3) Cargo Carriers M-29-C with LnOs transported aboard ships loaded with 17th Inf Regt.

49TH F.A. BN.	APA: LST: LST: LST: LST: AKA:							TOTAL :
	155:	28:	930:	24:	26:	80:		
Truck, 1/4 Ton 4 x 4.	3	2	0	0	15	0	0	20
Truck, 3/4 Ton 4 x 4 WC.	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
Truck, 1-1/2 Ton 6 x 6.	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
Truck, 2-1/2 Ton 6 x 6 SWB.	0	4	2	0	0	0	0	6
Truck, 2-1/2 Ton 6 x 6 LWB.	0	2	0	6	2	0	0	10
Tractor, High Speed M-5.	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	6
Tractor, D-7 w/dozer.	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
Carrier Cargo M-29-C.	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
Trucks, 2-1/2 Ton Amph DUKW.	0	15	0	0	0	0	0	15

TOTAL 3 38 2 6 17 6 72

Trailer, 1/4 Ton.	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	4
Trailer, 1 Ton.	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	4
Trailer, M-10.	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	4
Howitzer, 105mm.	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	12
Planes, L-4.	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2

TOTAL 2 18 4 0 0 2 26

Note: 49th Bn loaded three (3) Cargo Carriers M-29-C with LnOs transported aboard ships loaded with 32nd Inf Regt.

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57TH F.A. BN.	APA: 155:	LST: 29:	LST: 22:	LST: 26:	LST: 930:	AKA: 80:	TOTAL :
Truck, 1/4 Ton 4 x 4.	3	12	0	4	0	0	19
Truck, 3/4 Ton 4 x 4 WC.	0	1	0	0	0	5	6
Truck, 1-1/2 Ton 6 x 6.	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Truck, 2-1/2 Ton 6 x 6 SWB.	0	0	3	1	2	0	6
Truck, 2-1/2 Ton 6 x 6 LWB.	0	4	0	6	0	0	10
Tractor, High Speed M-5.	0	6	0	0	0	0	6
Tractor D-7, w/dozer.	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Carrier Cargo, M-29-C.	0	4	0	0	0	0	4
Trucks, 2-1/2 Ton Amph DUKW.	0	15	0	0	0	0	15
TOTAL	3	48	3	11	2	5	72
Trailer, 1/4 Ton.	2	2	2	0	0	1	7
Trailer, 1 Ton.	0	3	0	0	0	2	5
Trailer, M-10.	0	0	0	0	4	0	4
Howitzer, 105mm.	0	12	0	0	0	0	12
Plane L-4.	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
TOTAL	2	19	2	0	4	3	30

Note: 57th Bn loaded one (1) Cargo Carrier M-29-C on LST 27 and one (1) on LST 28.

VI. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA.

The Tractor Group transporting 7th Div Arty units departed from LEYTE 25 March 1945. The Transport Group transporting 7th Div Arty units left 26 March 1945. No unusual incidents occurred during the movement to the target area. Time aboard ship was utilized to orient all personnel on the situation and the plan of action. Physical exercises were conducted in all available spaces.

The 7th Div Arty arrived intact and in excellent condition off the target area in the early morning of 1 April 1945.

VII. UNLOADING.

With the arrival of the ships in the outer transport area off the west coast of OKINAWA at 0545, 1 April 1945, the Arty was thoroughly prepared to begin unloading. Arty personnel transported in APA 155 was transferred at 0700 by small boats to their respective LSTs and LSM, leaving behind on APA 155 the personnel of Hq and Hq Btry, 7th Div Arty, and the 31st Bn, less Btry "B". Actual debarkation of the Arty began at 1145, after it had been determined by the CG, 7th Div Arty that the beaches had been cleared of enemy small arms fire. The Arty Bn Cmdrs, with their reconnaissance parties, debarked in DUKWs, followed immediately by the remainder of their Bns to select positions just in from the beaches. The 48th Bn lost one (1) DUKW loaded with a 105mm Howitzer which was swamped by the wake from an LCI at this time. The advanced elements of the 7th Div Arty CP, under the Div Arty Executive, landed in LCMs and established a CP previously selected in a group of native tombs. The first ship to be beached and unloaded was LSM 26, loaded with Btry "B", 31st Bn. The Arty LSTs having a high priority on beaching came up to the coral reef at low tide enabling the vehicles loaded on the weather deck of the LSTs to drive down the ramp onto the

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reef and into shore without difficulty. All vehicles including the two (2) L-4 planes loaded in 2½-ton trucks were unloaded by dark of the first day. At high tide the water was four (4) and five (5) feet over the reef precluding the use of any vehicles for unloading except the DUKWs. The LCMs unloading equipment from APA 155 had difficulty in beaching at the reef due to the congestion of small boats. It finally became necessary to use DUKWs to complete the unloading. The exit roads leading from the beach were cut through the seawall. The roads were extremely narrow with ditches on both sides and extremely congested with personnel and vehicles which delayed the unloading of the Arty. An unloading platoon of about forty (40) men working a twelve (12) hour shift was furnished by each Bn for the unloading of the Arty LSTs. Because of the danger of Jap suicide planes crashing into the beached LSTs, the Navy provided some personnel for unloading which greatly facilitated the work. The unloading proceeded without incident and was completed by 2400, 3 April 1945.

VIII. NARRATIVE OF OPERATION:

1 April 1945:

The Arty of the 7th Inf Div, embarked aboard APA 155 (USS LYCOMING), LST 557, LST 558, LST 615, LSM 26, arrived in outer transport area off the west coast of OKINAWA at 0545, 1 April 1945 (Love Day). Transfer of Arty personnel from the LYCOMING to the respective LSTs and LSM was effected by small boat beginning at 0700. At 1030 orders to land the Arty were issued through Army and Naval channels. Actual debarkation commenced at 1145. The table below gives the times of unloading and landing of the 7th Div Arty on 1 April 1945.

	Hq Btry : 31st FA Bn	: Btry "B" : 48th	: 49th : 57th	:
Div Arty: (Less Btry "B"):	31st FA Bn	FA Bn	FA Bn	FA Bn
Began unloading.	1300	1220	1310	1145
Landed on beach.	1540	1540	1310	1430
Arrived at position.	1555	1630	1354	1500
First Btry in position.	--	1440	1440	1658
Second Btry in position.	--	1630	--	1450
Third Btry in position.	--	2125	--	1400
Registration completed.	--	1830	1830	1740
				1525
				1510
				1545
				1530
				1630
				1530

The 7th Div Arty CP was established in a group of tombs at 8188 0 and telephone communication with all Bns was completed by 1930. The 13th Engr Bn started construction of a Cub landing strip but the 7th Div Arty Air Officer selected a Cub landing strip at KADENA Airfield and this construction ceased. The status of unloading of the Arty, as of 2400, 1 April 1945, was as follows:

	APA 155	: LST 557	: LST 615	: LST 558	:
Hq Btry Div Arty	:	48th FA	: 49th FA	: 57th FA	:
31st (Less Btry "B"):		Bn	: Bn	: Bn	:
Howitzers.	100%		100%		100%
Ammunition.	5%		15%		20%
Vehicles.	33 1/3%		100%		50%
Water, Rations.	25%		100%		50%
Fuel.	25%		50%		50%
Planes.	--		100%		0%

2 April 1945:

Due to the rapid advance of the Inf who were encountering only light resistance, the 31st, 48th and 57th Bns were ordered to displace. The 31st Bn, which was in general support, began displacing by Btry to 8587 V at 0845 and completed its displacement by 1445. The 48th Bn, which was in direct support of the 17th Inf Regt, began displacing by Btry to 8588 Y at 1150 and completed its displacement by 1730. The 57th Bn, with the mission of reinforcing the fires of the 48th Bn, began displacing by Btry to 8687 D at 1220, after the first Btry of the 48th Bn was in position. The remainder of the 57th Bn completed its displacement by 1830. The 49th Bn remained in position, furnishing direct support to the 32nd Inf Regt. The 776th Amph Tk Bn displaced in the morning to positions north of the 31st Bn, from which position all Cos were registered by Observers from the 48th and 49th Bns. Two Cos were assigned the mission of reinforcing the fires of the 48th Bn, and the other two (2) Cos reinforced the 49th Bn. One SCR 609 radio was completely destroyed, and one (1) man of a FO Party was wounded when a bomb was dropped in the front lines of Co "I", 32nd Inf Regt, by a friendly plane. The Cub landing strip at KADENA Airfield was placed in operation and the first plane from the "Brodie" LST landed at 1040 and took off at 1100 on the first mission flown in the Corps sector. The 7th Div Arty CP displaced to 8587 K at 1500. The 225th FA Bn, with the mission of reinforcing the fires of the 7th Div Arty, went into position east of the KADENA Airfield and fired harassing missions during the night of 2-3 April 1945. One (1) plane, belonging to XXIV Corps, was flown off by a pilot from the 31st Bn at 1030. Because of an inadequate number of launching devices it was impossible to fly the two (2) L-4 Cubs off the "Brodie" LST. They were consequently unloaded by DUKW. The status of unloading of the Artillery as of 2400, 2 April 1945 was as follows:

APA 155	:	LST 557	:	LST 615	:	LST 558	:
Hq Btry Div Arty	:	48th FA	:	49th FA	:	57th FA	:
31st (Less "B" Btry):	Bn	:	Bn	:	Bn	:	
Howitzers.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
Ammunition.	40%	60%	65%	60%			
Vehicles.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
Water, Rations.	40%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
Fuel.	20%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
Planes.	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

3 April 1945:

The CG, 7th Div Arty, went on reconnaissance early in the morning for Bn areas and a Cub landing strip. The plan of operation for the 7th Inf Div was received at 1145, at which time the CG, Div Arty announced his plan for the employment of the Arty. The 49th Bn was ordered to displace to 8884 for the purpose of furnishing direct support to the 32nd Inf Regt, which had been ordered to advance south along the east coast of OKINAWA on the left flank of the Div. Two (2) Cos of the 776th Amph Tk Bn were ordered to displace near the 49th Bn in order to reinforce its fires. The 48th Bn was ordered to take over the mission of furnishing direct support to the 32nd Inf Regt until such time as the 49th Bn had completed its displacement when it would reinforce the 49th Bn. The 57th Bn was relieved of the mission of reinforcing the 48th Bn, and was ordered to displace to 8783 B for the purpose of furnishing direct support to the 184th Inf Regt which had been ordered to pass through elements of the 96th Inf Div and attack south on the right flank of the 7th Inf Div. The 31st Bn was assigned the mission of furnishing direct support to the 184th Inf Regt until such time as the 57th Bn had completed its displacement, when it would

revert to general support. Two (2) Cos of the 776th Amph Tk Bn were ordered to displace near the 57th Bn in order to reinforce its fires. Work was started on clearing a Cub landing field at 8785 B - 8685 D by the 13th Engr Bn and orders were issued to move the Air Section to the new strip when it was completed. The 49th Bn displaced to 8783 K and was in position by 1940. The 57th Bn completed its displacement to 8783 by 1715. The 776th Amph Tk Bn displaced to 8783 and was registered by Observers from the 49th and 57th Bns. The 225th Bn reinforced the fires of the 7th Div Arty from position at 8486 Y. Harassing missions were assigned to all Bns. The 31st Bn located twenty seven (27) civilians lurking in a tomb and turned them over to the MPs. One (1) Jap soldier and a civilian were killed when they resisted arrest. The 57th Bn had one (1) man killed during the night of 3-4 April 1945 when he was mistaken for an enemy soldier. At 1000, Btry "A", 48th Bn, received one (1) 105mm Howitzer to replace the one lost when being unloaded in a DUKW from the LST on 1 April 1945. Eight (8) L-4 Planes were operating off KADENA Airfield throughout the day. APA 155 was unloaded by 1500; LST 615 was unloaded by 0930; LST 557 was unloaded by 1630 and LST 558 was unloaded by 2400, 3 April 1945. The unloading of all LSTs was delayed due to the necessity of using DUKWs for unloading APA 155 because of conditions at the reef. The unloading of LST 558 was further delayed because it retracted from the beach, without competent Navy orders, due to apprehension of attack by Jap suicide planes.

4 April 1945:

7th Inf Div Arty, 145th and 225th FA Bns, and 776th Amph Tk Bn fired 1800 rounds on harassing missions throughout the night of 3-4 April 1945. The 31st and 48th Bns were ordered to displace to the south of positions occupied by the 49th Bn. The 48th Bn began displacing to 8781 at 0630. The 31st Bn finished displacing to 8681 by 1345. Cos "C" and "D", 776th Amph Tk Bn, were assigned the mission of furnishing direct support to the 17th Inf Regt and adjusted on points along the coast, using Observers from the 48th Bn in the sector of the 17th Inf Regt. Cos "A" and "B", 776th Amph Tk Bn, continued to reinforce the fires of the 57th Bn. The 49th and 57th Bns remained in position, furnishing direct support to the 32nd and 184th Inf Regts, respectively. Two (2) FOs of the 57th Bn were seriously wounded by enemy machine gun fire while in the front lines of the 184th Inf Regt. One (1) L-4 Ln Plane of the 48th Bn was damaged beyond repair when caught in a crosswind while taking off. 7th Div Arty began displacing at 1300 and the new CP opened at KISHABA (8782 05) at 1600. The 57th Bn fired a Bn concentration on an estimated Co of Japs with excellent effect. Air Section displaced to the new Cub landing strip.

5 April 1945:

The 57th Bn completed displacing two (2) Btries to 8680 0 by 1500. The 31st Bn reinforced the fires of the 57th Bn during the displacement. Cos "C" and "D", 776th Amph Tk, displaced south along east coast to 8979 F and 8980 F, with the mission of providing reinforcing fires in the sectors of the 32nd and 184th Inf Regts as well as being able to fire along the coast in the sector of the 17th Inf Regt. The 49th Bn was ordered to displace as far forward as possible the morning of 6 April 1945. The 502nd AAA (Gun) Bn whose mission was to reinforce the fires of the 7th Div Arty against land targets, reverted to control of 97th AAA Group, since its Btries were so far north of the front lines as to preclude their use on reinforcing missions in the Div sector. The LnO with the 1st Mar Div returned and was assigned to the 96th Div Arty. The 225th Bn displaced to position near the 31st Bn. 2250 rounds of ammunition were fired by 7th Div Arty, 225th Bn, and 776th Amph Tk Bn during the night of 5-6 April 1945 on harassing missions. Increasing numbers of enemy installations were being picked up and taken under fire throughout the day. An Air Observer adjusted the 31st Bn on an enemy ammunition dump which blew up. The Bn Cmdr, 31st Bn, riding in a $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck, hit an anti-tank mine which blew off the front of the vehicle without injury to any personnel. Observation was hindered by low

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P I N N A C L E H I L L (8577 S)



P I N N A C L E H I L L (8577 S)

Photos by 7th Div Arty Air Sec.

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hanging clouds and fog. An Air Observer and Pilot from the 31st Bn were wounded by two (2) Japs discovered lurking in a cave in the vicinity of the Cub air strip. A forward Arty ammunition dump was established near the 7th Div Arty CP, and by 1900, 4470 rounds of ammunition were hauled from the beach over circuitous one-lane roads. Sixteen (16) 2½-ton trucks were available for hauling ammunition and were able to complete only three (3) trips in a ten (10) hour period.

6 April 1945:

Btry "B", 57th Bn, displaced at 0730 to positions occupied by the remainder of the Bn. The 49th Bn completed its displacement to 8778 F by 0930 and resumed its mission of furnishing direct support to the 32nd Inf Regt. The 48th Bn assumed direct support of the 32nd Inf Regt until the 49th Bn had completed its displacement, when it resumed its mission of reinforcing the 49th Bn. Cos "A" and "B", 776th Amph Tk Bn, displaced south and continued with their mission of furnishing reinforcing fires to the 57th Bn. Cos "C" and "D", 776th Amph Tk Bn, remained in position and continued with their mission of being prepared to fire along the coast in the sector of the 17th and 32nd Inf Regts to repel any amphibious landing by the enemy. Two (2) OPs were set up to maintain continuous observation of the beaches. The Cub planes provided air observation and adjusted fire on enemy machine guns, mortars, Arty, tanks, and supply dumps. The 31st Bn set up a Div OP from which the CG of the Div adjusted fire on targets of opportunity. The 49th Bn received enemy Arty fire which inflicted no damage. The 57th Bn fired a preparation on a strongly entrenched position on Pinnacle Hill (8577 S) with good effect, killing over sixty (60) Japs and enabling the 184th Inf Regt to occupy the position with a minimum of casualties. During the night of 6-7 April 1945 the 7th Div Arty, 776th Amph Tk Bn, 225th and 145th Bns fired 2300 rounds on harassing and interdiction missions for the purposes of preventing the enemy from organizing a coordinated attack during the night. A total of 11,645 rounds of 105mm ammunition was hauled to the forward dump, using twenty three (23) trucks which succeeded in making four (4) round trips.

7 April 1945:

The 48th Bn began displacing to 8677 H at 0630 and the last Btry was in position and ready to fire at 0940. The 287th FA Obsn Bn set up sound and flash OPs in the Div zone of action. Naval Gunfire, using Plane Spot, adjusted on enemy installations south of grid line 71. The 184th Inf Regt encountered increasing resistance in its sector from the vicinity of Tomb Hill (8475 I) and Red Hill (8477 Q) and was able to advance only after intense shelling of dominating terrain features by the 57th and 31st Bns in its zone of action. 3016 rounds were fired by the 7th Div Arty, 776th Amph Tk Bn, and the 225th and 145th Bns throughout the night on harassing missions. The enemy shelled positions occupied by the 48th and 49th Bns throughout the day, sporadically increasing in intensity after dark until shelling by Corps Arty silenced the enemy Btries. The 49th Bn scored a direct hit on an enemy tank. 1200 rounds of 105mm ammunition were destroyed when friendly AA shells fell into an ammunition dump at KADENA Airfield. 155mm ammunition was becoming scarce due to difficulty in unloading on the beaches and because enemy air attacks and destroyed some ammunition ships. A forward ammunition dump was established at 8576 E and 6400 rounds were hauled there from KADENA Airfield. An S-2 Radio Net for the dissemination of information to all Bns was ordered to be opened 8 April 1945. The Inf front lines were able to move forward only 1500 yards as increasing enemy resistance was encountered.

8 April 1945:

The Arty of the Div remained in position and supported the attack of the 32nd and 184th Inf Regts against increasing enemy resistance. The enemy shelled front lines with mortars, light and medium Arty. Numerous targets of opportunity were fired on during the day. Targets included troops, mortars, Arty

pieces, AA guns, pillboxes, caves, tanks, and strongly entrenched positions. Naval Gunfire provided night illumination and fired on targets of opportunity using Plane Spot. A number of enemy Arty pieces were located which the enemy pulled into position, fired a few rounds and then pulled back into a cave before the piece could be fired upon effectively. Other enemy Arty pieces were apparently emplaced in caves out of which they fired in a comparatively narrow sector and could be discovered only accidentally when an observer saw a flash. The 287th FA Obsn Bn located and adjusted fire on several enemy field pieces. Preparations were fired by the 49th and 57th Bns in support of the Inf just prior to the jumpoff. The 776th Amph Tk Bn finished registering on critical points along the southern portion of the east coast in the Div sector. The 4th Bn, 11th Mar Arty Regt, was attached to the 7th Inf Div and assigned the mission of reinforcing the fires of the 57th Bn. Orders were received from XXIV Corps that, due to the shortage of Arty ammunition, not more than 0.3 Units of Fire would be expended except in case of emergency. This allowance was later increased to 0.5 Units of Fire. 7324 rounds of 105mm ammunition, 1055 rounds of 155mm ammunition, and 995, 155mm powder charges were hauled to the forward dump. The 7th Div Arty received orders to turn over 8000 rounds of 105mm ammunition to the 96th Inf Div. Two (2) officers and two (2) enlisted men of a FO Party of the 57th Bn were wounded and evacuated. 1950 rounds were fired throughout the night of 8-9 April 1945 on harassing and interdiction missions on definitely located targets by the 7th Div Arty, 776th Amph Tk Bn, and the 225th Bn.

9 April 1945:

The enemy shelled the front lines with mortars, and light and medium Arty. The enemy was utilizing the commanding terrain in his possession for terrestrial observation of friendly activity and was able to bring accurate Arty fire on troops, trucks, and tanks. He fired counterbattery fire on the 48th Bn and on tanks in the sector of the 32nd Inf Regt. The 31st Bn established a Div OP at 8577 S, from which precision adjustments were made on all hills which overlooked the sector of the Div with the object of neutralizing enemy OPs. Increasing use was made of Naval Gunfire with three (3) ships, using Plane Spot, firing on targets of opportunity with special attention being given to enemy Arty emplacements. Naval Gunfire scored direct hits on six (6) Arty positions. The 57th Bn had one (1) man killed, one (1) officer, and four (4) enlisted men wounded in the front lines. The 49th Bn had three (3) enlisted men wounded. Two (2) of the men were riding in a Cargo Carrier M-29-C when it received a direct hit by an enemy shell. The 4th Bn, 11th Mar Arty Regt, displaced at 8679 B from which position it reinforced the fires of the 57th Bn and sent a LnO and FO Parties to the 3rd Bn, 184th Inf Regt. A High Performance Plane was assigned to the Div for the purpose of locating enemy Arty positions. 1760 rounds of ammunition were fired by the 7th Div Arty, 776th Amph Tk Bn, and the XXIV Corps Arty throughout the night of 9-10 April 1945, on harassing and interdiction missions.

10 April 1945:

Following a short preparation, the Inf jumped off only to receive such a heavy volume of machine gun and mortar fire that it was unable to advance. The 2nd Bn, 184th Inf Regt, was able to capture Tomb Hill (8475 I) and remain there after beating back numerous persistent enemy counterattacks. Observation was limited by fog and rain which made the Cub strip inoperative and limited observation from OPs. The 57th Bn was called upon to fire its normal barrage in front of the 184th Inf Regt in order to stop the enemy in his attempt to recapture Tomb Hill. 1326 rounds of ammunition were fired on interdiction and harassing missions throughout the night of 10-11 April 1945.

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TOMB HILL (8475 I)

RED HILL (8477 Q)

Photos by 7th Div Arty Air Sec.

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11 April 1945:

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The Div remained in position and dug in preparatory to resuming the attack south when sufficient Arty ammunition could be unloaded to support the Inf. Naval Gunfire, using Air Spot, fired on enemy installations including Arty positions in caves. Inf action was limited to patrolling and normal barrages were fired to stop the enemy in his attempt to retake Tomb Hill. Ln Planes were inoperational until 1200, due to the muddy condition of the Air Strip. Heavy enemy AA fire kept the Cub planes behind the front lines. Five hundred seventy five (575) rounds of Arty ammunition were expended on harassing missions throughout the night of 11-12 April 1945. Corps issued orders restricting ammunition expenditure to 0.2 units of fire for all Arty pieces. The 49th Bn had one (1) man killed and a 2½-ton truck destroyed by a land mine. Two (2) other men were wounded while with a FO Party.

12 April 1945:

Co "D", 776th Amph Tk Bn, was relieved of attachment to 7th Div Arty and attached to 27th Div Arty. Co "C", 776th Amph Tk Bn, displaced to 8677 S and was assigned the mission of reinforcing the 49th Bn. The Arty of the Div improved its positions, conducted target area survey, fired destruction fire on all observed enemy fortifications, and fired on targets of opportunity including enemy troops, trucks, and Arty positions. One (1) enemy 105mm Howitzer was knocked out four hundred (400) yards from the front lines where it was found by a friendly patrol which killed twenty five (25) Japs hiding in a cave nearby. Observation by Ln Planes was continuous throughout the day and photo coverage of front lines was accomplished. Naval Gunfire continued to be used on targets of opportunity although it was limited in the afternoon due to a report of approaching enemy planes which grounded all spotting planes. The 31st and 57th Bns commenced construction of bomb proof OPs on Tomb Hill (8475 I) with the assistance of the 13th Engr Bn. Survey in the target area was continued. The 57th Bn killed a Jap soldier in the Bn area. The 49th Bn fired its normal barrage for the night on a group of Japs assembling for a counterattack. Intense enemy Arty shelling fell on the front line troops and Arty just after dark, 12 April 1945. 7th Div Arty, with attachments, fired two hundred eighteen (218) rounds of ammunition on harassing missions during the night of 12-13 April 1945. One (1) man of a Ln Party was killed by an enemy Arty shell while he was lying in a foxhole.

13 April 1945:

Plans were made for providing Arty support for a coordinated attack scheduled for 19 April 1945, at which time it was estimated that sufficient ammunition would be available. The Inf remained in position, sending out patrols to locate enemy installations. Friendly Arty positions continued to receive sporadic, unorganized shelling. The 31st and 57th Bns continued construction of a bomb proof OP on Tomb Hill which was shelled throughout the day. The 57th Bn had one (1) man killed in his foxhole at Tomb Hill when Japs armed with improvised spears infiltrated through the front lines at night. The 31st Bn had four (4) men hit by an AA burst. The 48th Bn had one (1) man wounded by grenade fragments when a stray horse set off a trip wire. Numerous suspected Arty positions were fired on by the Arty and Naval Gunfire. Vertical and oblique photos, taken by the Div Arty Air Section, were assembled into a photo map. One (1) Btry of 504th AAA (Gun) Bn displaced to 8479 02 with the mission of reinforcing the fires of the 7th Div Arty.

14 April 1945:

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A Jap attack on Tomb Hill was repulsed by Arty fire. The 48th and 49th Bns received intermittent shelling throughout the day. Eight (8) rounds of 75mm fire fell in the area of Btry "A", 31st Bn, killing one (1) officer and injuring three (3) men. The Arty fire was apparently directed at the 225th Bn which was located in the immediate vicinity. Btry "A", 31st Bn, displaced to an alternate position and alternate positions for Btries "B" and "C" were selected and preparations made to displace. 4th Bn, 11th Mar Arty Regt, set up a flash base for

the purpose of locating enemy Arty positions at night by "Flash Bang". Two (2) Battleships and one (1) Cruiser were available throughout the day for fire on areas and for counterbattery. Btry "B", 502nd AAA (Gun) Bn, displaced to 8783 R with the mission of supporting the 7th Inf Div by firing on ground targets. The 7th Div Arty, with attached units, fired limited harassing missions throughout the night. A roving gun was used for the purpose of adjusting on enemy entrenchments. Twenty four (24) rounds of WP ammunition were destroyed by enemy Arty fire which landed in a forward ammunition dump.

15 April 1945:

The 57th Bn captured one (1) Jap soldier in its area, and picked up one (1) Jap civilian who was able to speak English fluently. The 48th Bn received eighteen (18) rounds of enemy 150mm shells which were either duds or were fired with a delay action fuze which caused no damage in the soft soil. An amphibian tank of the 776th Amph Tk Bn was hit and a pile of 75mm ammunition set on fire. The Navy provided two (2) Battleships, one (1) Cruiser and two (2) Destroyers to provide harassing, counterbattery fire, and night illumination.

16 April 1945:

The Arty of the 7th Inf Div, assigned and attached, continued to improve their positions and haul ammunition. Two (2) Btries of the 31st Bn displaced to an alternate position. At a meeting of Bn Cmdrs, the Arty plan for the attack on 19 April 1945 was announced and everyone oriented on the operation. The enemy continued to shell positions occupied by the 49th Bn and the 776th Amph Tk Bn. One amphibian tank was hit and several men injured by high explosive fragments. The CG, 7th Div Arty, visited XXIV Corps Hq and 96th Div Arty Hq for the purpose of coordinating the Arty available to the 7th Div Arty. One (1) Btry of the 502nd and one (1) Btry of the 504th AAA (Gun) Bns were registered on check points using a Ln Plane and computing the initial data by means of Radar. The Navy continued to shell installations around YONABARU, firing seventy three (73) rounds of 16" shells, seventy (70) rounds of 14" shells, two hundred ninety eight (298) rounds of 5" shells, and an unreported number of 8" shells at camouflaged enemy installations, including AA positions, Arty positions, supply dumps, and truck parks. Naval Gunfire succeeded in destroying a camouflaged observation tower in the vicinity of SHURI.

17 April 1945:

All Arty Bns started registration on targets to be covered by scheduled fire on D-Day. The enemy shelled areas occupied by the Arty of the Div, causing no damage. The 4th Bn, 11th Mar Arty Regt, continued experimenting with its "Dadar" equipment in attempts to locate enemy Btries by sound ranging, without much success. Two (2) medium Bns and one (1) light Bn fired a "Time on Target" mission on an enemy Btry located by "Flash Bang" from several OPs. The mission was successful, for the enemy Btry was silenced for the night and a large fire with numerous explosions was started. The Navy fired six hundred ninety two (692) rounds of 5" ammunition, five hundred sixteen (516) rounds of 6" ammunition, thirty nine (39) rounds of 14" ammunition, and one hundred thirty eight (138) rounds of 16" ammunition in the 7th Inf Div sector throughout the day and night of 17 April 1945 on enemy installations.

18 April 1945:

Preparations were completed for the coordinated attack by three (3) Divs in line against the enemy main defenses north of SHURI. All Arty Bns completed registration for preparation and scheduled fires. The 57th Bn fired a screening mission in order to allow the Inf to evacuate three (3) wounded men of a patrol who were pinned down by enemy fire in front of the front lines. An Arty Observer reported the appearance of ten (10) Japs with packs and camouflaged

helmets in entrances to caves, apparently indicating that the enemy was bringing up fresh troops. One (1) Battleship, two (2) Cruisers, and two (2) Destroyers furnished Naval Gunfire in the Div sector on enemy emplacements and installations for the purpose of softening up the enemy in preparation for the D-Day attack of XXIV Corps. The enemy laid down a particularly heavy concentration of Arty and mortar fire on the front lines of the 32nd Inf Regt shortly after dusk.

19 April 1945:

Limited harassing and counterbattery fires were delivered in the 7th Inf Div sector during the hours of darkness by the 7th Div Arty, 4th Bn, 11th Mar Arty Regt, 776th Amph Tk Bn (less Co "D"), Btry "A", 504th AAA (Gun) Bn, Btry "B", 502nd AAA (Gun) Bn, XXIV Corps Arty, and III Phib Corps Arty. The Arty fired a forty (40) minute preparation beginning at 0600, using a large proportion of delay fuzes to dig the enemy out of his caves and covered emplacements. The Inf attacked at 0640, with two (2) Bns of the 184th Inf Regt on the right and two (2) Bns of the 32nd Inf Regt on the left. The 17th Inf Regt remained in Div reserve. After the attack, Arty fires were lifted to commanding terrain features which were effectively neutralized and screened with smoke. The SLAUGHTER Group, consisting of the 57th Bn, 4th Bn, 11th Mar Arty Regt, and Cos "A" and "B", 776th Amph Tk Bn, provided direct support to the 184th Inf Regt. The HARRISON Group, consisting of the 49th Bn, 48th Bn, and Co "C", 776th Amph Tk Bn, provided direct support to the 32nd Inf Regt. The GEORGE Group, consisting of the 31st Bn, Btry "A", 504th AAA (Gun) Bn, and Btry "B", 502nd AAA (Gun) Bn, provided general support. The JACKSON Group, consisting of the 225th FA Bn (155mm Howitzers) and 1st Mar Arty Bn (155mm Howitzers), reinforced the fires of the 7th Div Arty. Five (5) ships provided Naval Gunfire on rear areas for the purpose of disrupting communications and preventing movement by the enemy. Conical Hill (8271 G) was kept under fire and screened with smoke throughout the day. One (1) Navy Spotter Plane was shot down by enemy fire. Co "B", 776th Amph Tk Bn, displaced, beginning at 1200. The 57th Bn began preparing positions in the vicinity of Tomb Hill. The Inf was able to advance less than 500 yards against stiff enemy resistance. A heavy downpour in the afternoon stopped any further progress and the Inf dug in for the night. The 49th Bn had one (1) officer and one (1) enlisted man wounded, and the 4th Bn, 11th Mar Arty Regt, had one (1) officer killed by a sniper in the CP of the 3rd Bn, 184th Inf Regt. Ammunition expended by 7th Div Arty and attached units consisted of 0.38 units of fire for 155mm ammunition, 1.41 units of fire for 105mm ammunition, 0.85 units of fire for 90mm ammunition, 0.55 units of fire for 75mm ammunition. The Navy fired one hundred forty four (144) rounds of 16" ammunition, one hundred fifty (150) rounds of 8" ammunition, and three hundred ninety two (392) rounds of 5" ammunition against Arty in caves, supply dumps, and other military installations, in support of the 7th Inf Div.

20 April 1945:

The Arty continued to support the attack of the Div by fire against countless enemy caves and tunnels. Enemy Arty was active throughout the day, firing at tops of hills occupied by friendly troops and tanks. The Arty fired a preparation in the morning and afternoon for a coordinated attack by the Inf. Particular attention was given to locating enemy Arty, utilizing all observation agencies including the Air Spotting Planes of the Navy. Navy ships off the coast of OKINAWA furnished continuous support day and night, firing three hundred seventy four (374) rounds of 12" ammunition, three hundred thirteen (313) rounds of 8" ammunition, one hundred twenty five (125) rounds of 6" ammunition, and 1294 rounds of 5" ammunition in the Div sector, knocking out a number of enemy guns. The Arty fired 0.47 units of fire of 155mm ammunition, 0.64 units of fire of 105mm ammunition, 0.43 units of fire of 90mm ammunition, and 0.48 units of fire of 75mm ammunition.

21 April 1945:

The Div continued its attack to the south gaining ground by yards. Arty fire using precision adjustments and time fire was used on the reverse slopes to silence mortars and kill Japs who threw grenades and satchel charges on the tops of the hills captured by the Inf. The 31st and 57th Bns prepared new positions further south in order to be prepared to displace forward once the Inf captured Hill 178 (8374 B), the dominating terrain feature in the Div zone of action. One (1) officer of the 49th Bn was killed in action while a member of FO Party by enemy machine gun fire. The 31st Bn had 1400 powder charges and one hundred (100) fuzes destroyed when an ammunition dump caught fire from undetermined causes. The Navy fired nine hundred twenty (920) rounds of 5" ammunition, seven hundred five (705) rounds of 6" ammunition, two hundred eighty eight (288) rounds of 8" ammunition against enemy installations in rear areas within the sector of the 7th Inf Div. The Arty fired 0.25 units of fire of 155mm ammunition, 0.46 units of fire of 105mm ammunition, 0.5 units of fire of 90mm ammunition, and 0.11 units of fire of 75mm ammunition.

22 April 1945:


The CP of the 7th Div Arty was hit when a Jap plane dropped a stick of five (5) bombs at 0200. Two (2) men were killed and five (5) others wounded. The straw thatched native buildings surrounding the CP were set on fire and burned to the ground. Three hundred (300) rounds of 105mm ammunition in wooden containers within two hundred (200) yards of the CP were set on fire. Shell fragments and brass cases showered the area around the CP for the remainder of the night until no more ammunition was left to burn. Because of the desperate resistance put up by a fanatical enemy from caves and tunnels literally honey-combing the coral escarpments and outcroppings it was decided to emplace a 155mm Howitzer in the front lines for purpose of sealing up the enemy in his holes. Btry "C", 31st Bn, emplaced one (1) 155mm Howitzer in the sector of the 3rd Bn, 184th Inf Regt. After firing seven (7) rounds from the initial position the cannoneers were driven from their piece by enemy machine gun fire which opened up at a range of less than two hundred (200) yards. Two (2) cannoneers were wounded and the tire, trail, and tube of the Howitzer were sprayed with machine gun bullets. An enemy 150mm Howitzer began firing into the area and succeeded in obtaining a range bracket on the 155mm Howitzer, but failed to obtain a deflection bracket. Screened by smoke, the cannoneers succeeded in taking the Howitzer out of action and withdrawing it to another position from which forty three (43) rounds of 155mm Howitzer ammunition, with the concrete piercing fuze, were fired into Crag Hill (8374 V) at a point blank range of eight hundred (800) yards. The commands for this firing consisted of telling the gunner to go right or left a hair and up or down a bit. For the amount of ammunition expended, the maximum effect obtained for each round was a target hit and all cave and tunnel openings were destroyed or closed up. The Inf was able to occupy the target after burning out the remaining stunned Japs with flame throwers. A friendly medium tank completely demolished a $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck belonging to the 31st Bn. On the Div left flank the Inf was able to make gains by the yard to the base of Hill 178 (8374 B) and to the top of Skyline Ridge (8474 F). The enemy had constructed tunnels through the ridges so that when he was driven from the front face of a ridge he withdrew through the tunnel to the reverse slope, which he defended to the death. By sitting in his hole with overhead protection, time fire adjusted on the reverse slopes was relatively ineffective and only a direct hit could hurt him. As friendly Inf gradually worked its way to the top of a hill, the enemy opened up with a carefully adjusted mortar barrage on the top of the hill to make that position nearly untenable. He also used grenades, satchel charges, grenade dischargers, and snipers to prevent the Inf from gaining the reverse slope. A Jap mortar shell, landing in the middle of a FO Party of the 57th Bn, killed one (1) officer and wounded every man of the party. Corps Arty fired numerous

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S K Y L I N E R I D G E (8474 F)



HILL 178 (8374 B)

Photos by 7th Div Arty Air Sec.

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"Time on Target" missions at known enemy Arty positions with varying results. In some cases, the enemy stopped firing from the position shelled. Throughout the night the Japs laid down an intense mortar barrage on Skyline Ridge (8474 F) and shelled heavily the Arty OPs on Tomb Hill with 150mm and 75mm shells. The Navy fired nine hundred seventy two (972) rounds of 5" ammunition, one hundred fifty nine (159) rounds of 6" ammunition, and three hundred twenty two (322) rounds of 8" ammunition against enemy targets, using Spotting Planes, which not only adjusted the fire but also strafed enemy personnel in the open which could not be hit with Naval Gunfire.

23 April 1945:

The enemy defended from well prepared positions on the reverse slopes of commanding ridges, holding up the advance of the Inf. The 1st Bn, 17th Inf Regt, relieved the 3rd Bn, 184th Inf Regt, on the Div right flank and completed occupying Crag Hill (8374 V), encountering little resistance after the shelling at point blank range by the 155mm Howitzer the previous day. The 3rd Bn, 17th Inf Regt, was attached to the 27th Inf Div on the west flank of the XXIV Corps. In Planes provided continuous air observation during daylight hours. Beach defenses assigned 7th Div Arty were completed and occupied. The 49th Bn had two (2) men of a FO Party wounded in action. 7th Div Arty received two (2) officer replacements who were assigned to the 57th Bn. The new Variable Time Fuze was delivered to the light Bns which conducted some experiments with it, but results achieved were unsatisfactory because the majority of rounds fired burst above the front lines rather than at the target. Front line troops continued to receive intermittent shelling and mortar fire. The front lines received heavy shelling shortly after dusk which continued until midnight. The medium Arty fired Bn concentrations on previously reported locations of enemy Arty in an effort to silence the enemy. The Navy furnished deep Arty support throughout the day and fired harassing and illuminating missions at night. One (1) Battleship, three (3) Cruisers, and one (1) Destroyer fired forty three (43) rounds of 16" ammunition, three hundred thirty five (335) rounds of 8" ammunition, one hundred twenty nine (129) rounds of 6" ammunition, and eight hundred sixteen (816) rounds of 5" ammunition. A number of enemy Arty pieces were hit and destroyed. Many caves, including some which the Japs had succeeded in reopening during the night, were closed by the shelling. A large concrete blockhouse with numerous gun ports was taken under fire and partially destroyed by 8" shells, using both AP and HC shells. A Navy Spotting Plane strafed enemy fuel and ammunition dumps, setting them on fire and also adjusted medium Arty on an enemy Arty piece which could not be hit with Naval Gunfire. The 1st Mar (155mm Gun) Bn emplaced a 155mm gun at night just behind the front lines for the purpose of using direct fire against enemy caves on the "Escarpment" at TANABARU (8275 N). One (1) man was killed and several wounded when the piece was shelled during the night. The enemy withdrew from the "Escarpment" so there was no need for the 155mm gun.

24 April 1945:

Weather was overcast with light rains which reduced visibility to less than a thousand feet. In Planes could not land and take off from airstrip so they had to use KADENA Airfield. Navy Spotting Planes could not be used which limited Naval Gunfire to harassing and neutralization missions on area targets. The enemy withdrew and the 17th Inf Regt, with 1st Bn, 184th Inf Regt attached, less 3rd Bn which had relieved the 184th Inf Regt, seized Hill 178 (8374 B) and the 96th Inf Div captured the "Escarpment" at TANABARU (8275 N) and advanced beyond TANABARU. Approximately fifty (50) rounds of 105mm ammunition fell into positions occupied by the 57th Bn, at least fifty percent (50%) of which were duds. There were no casualties. The 32nd Inf Regt, on the Div left flank, did not advance during the day but waited for the 17th Inf Regt to consolidate its positions on Hill 178 (8374 B).

25 April 1945:

The 48th Bn received between twenty five (25) and thirty (30) rounds of 75mm AA shells in the Bn area from 0210 to 0230, which killed one (1) man and wounded two (2) others. The 4th Bn, 11th Mar Arty Regt, displaced during the morning to new positions at 8577 Q. The 57th Bn displaced to 8476 J. The roads were muddy and slippery, making all travel difficult. In Planes were grounded in the morning due to poor visibility but were able to resume flying in the afternoon when the weather cleared. The 31st Bn began construction of an OP on Hill 178 (8374 B). The 49th Bn adjusted time fire on an estimated Co of Japs in the open with excellent results. Air Observer adjusted one (1) piece of the 31st Bn on enemy troops assembling in a group of trees. Fifteen (15) minutes after the adjustment was completed, a Bn concentration was fired with excellent results. The Inf was encountering only scattered resistance and was able to send patrols forward of the front lines in order to locate enemy positions in preparation for a coordinated attack the following day.

26 April 1945:

The Inf conducted vigorous patrolling along the entire front in order to locate enemy dispositions. Positions were consolidated on commanding ground and a number of enemy attacks were beaten back at night by the firing of normal barrages by the Arty. Poor visibility restricted ground and air observation. Naval Gunfire was limited largely to harassing missions due to the inability of Spotting Planes observing targets through the fog. A heavy air strike was made by the Air Corps on the base of Conical Hill (8271 G), using 1000 and 2000 pound bombs. The 31st Bn displaced by Btry to 8577 K during the morning. One (1) officer of the 49th Bn was seriously wounded by shell fragments while acting as a FO. Two (2) missions were fired by the Arty, using High Performance Plane Spot. The 31st Bn completed construction of OP Number 3 on Hill 178 (8374 B), and the 57th Bn constructed an OP utilizing an enemy tunnel at the same place. Japs attempted to infiltrate front lines, carrying demolition charges for the purpose of mining roads and destroying CPs. Harassing fires by 7th Div Arty, XXIV Corps Arty, and AA Arty were fired throughout the night. Enemy shelling in the 7th Inf Div sector during the night was lighter than usual. A night flying plane flew over the enemy lines throughout the bright moonlit night in an attempt to spot enemy Arty flashes.

27 April 1945:

Visibility was very poor in the morning but improved in the afternoon. Light rain made supply roads leading to the front nearly impassable to wheeled vehicles. The M-5 tractors, pulling M-10 trailers, were able to haul ammunition without difficulty. The 1st Bn, 17th Inf Regt, continued to push forward on the Div right flank to seize commanding terrain which overlooked the sector of the 32nd Inf Regt on the Div left flank. A 155mm gun was emplaced during the night near Hill 178 (8374 B) for the purpose of using direct fire against enemy caves and concrete emplacements in the vicinity of Conical Hill (8271 G). The 48th Bn had one (1) officer killed and one (1) enlisted man seriously wounded by enemy mortar fire. The 7th Div Arty was understrength by twenty five (25) officers and two hundred forty nine (249) enlisted men as of this date. Fifty (50) enlisted men were received as replacements. The 776th Amph Tk Bn reverted to Div control and was no longer available for reinforcing missions. Several enemy planes were active during the early part of the evening but otherwise the enemy was quiet during the night. The Navy furnished four (4) ships throughout the night for harassing missions and night illumination. Throughout the day, six (6) ships were on station, firing observed fires using Spotting Planes. An High Performance Spotting Plane strafed and set fire to a gasoline dump and a number of enemy trucks.

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
~~DECLASSIFIED~~



ESCARPMENT

NORTH OF TANABARU

(8275 N)



CONICAL HILL (8271 G)

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Photos by 7th Div Arty Air Sec.

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28 April 1945:

The 1st Bn, 32nd Inf Regt, advanced several hundred yards but had to withdraw to its original position in the afternoon upon receiving a heavy concentration of mortar fire. The 17th Inf Regt on the right flank was able to make only slight progress against a carefully coordinated defense put up by the enemy. The enemy fired 75mm AA at observation planes in order to interfere with observation. All Air Observers intensified efforts to locate enemy Arty and succeeded in destroying or damaging numerous pieces. Some colored smoke ammunition for marking targets was received and the present lot of VT fuzes was found to be defective and was withdrawn from use. The 155mm gun, using direct laying, emplaced near Hill 178 (8374 B), succeeded in completely knocking off a concrete blockhouse atop Conical Hill (8271 G), which was used by the enemy as an OP. Ten (10) FA officers, four (4) Signal Corps officers, and two (2) Corps of Engr officers were assigned to the 7th Div Arty as replacements. Naval Gunfire was having difficulty in locating profitable targets. Six (6) ships were assigned to the 7th Inf Div to fire on targets of opportunity. The enemy succeeded in flying nuisance missions over our front lines and rear areas, using a few planes which inflicted little damage to friendly installations.

29 April 1945:

Activities in the front lines were generally limited to Inf attacks against limited objectives. Friendly tanks received intense concentrations of enemy Arty fire whenever they moved forward. The Inf received considerable mortar fire upon launching an attack against an objective. The Arty supported the attack of the Inf by firing on areas suspected of containing mortars and machine guns. Very little activity was observed in the enemy lines. The enemy was dug in and fired only whenever a target presented itself. The 155mm gun in the vicinity of Hill 178 (8374 B) used direct fire on caves and emplacements located near Conical Hill (8271 G). A $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton truck belonging to the 31st Bn was damaged by enemy shell fragments on the skyline in the vicinity of Hill 178 (8374 B). Enemy Arty was directed against the 155mm gun and medium tanks, which caused casualties among troops nearby and cut wire lines to OPs on Hill 178 (8374 B). The 49th Bn had two (2) men wounded in action. The 4th Bn, 11th Mar Arty Regt, received orders detaching it from the 7th Div Arty, effective the morning of 30 April 1945. Four (4) ships fired night illumination, counter-battery, and harassing missions throughout the night. Six (6) ships, each with its own Air Spot, were assigned to the 7th Inf Div during daylight and fired on caves containing supplies and Arty pieces.

30 April 1945:

The 4th Bn, 11th Mar Arty Regt, was relieved of attachment to 7th Div Arty. The 362nd FA Bn, 96th Inf Div, was assigned to reinforce the fires of the 57th Bn and registered in the sector of the 17th Inf Regt. A second 155mm gun was emplaced near Hill 178 (8374 B) and both guns began a systematic destruction of all caves, tunnels, and emplacements on the forward slopes of the innumerable hills and ridges to the direct front. The 77th Inf Div began relieving the 96th Inf Div and the 1st Mar Div began relieving the 27th Inf Div. The 7th Inf Div remained in the front lines with the 17th Inf Regt on the right, the 184th Inf Regt relieving the 32nd Inf Regt in the center and the 7th Rcn Trp on the left flank along the beach. Each 105mm Howitzer Bn furnished two (2) LACs and four (4) FQs with the assault Regts. The 48th Bn furnished one (1) FQ with the 7th Rcn Trp. All Bns continued to man OPs on Hill 178 (8374 B) and Skyline Ridge (8474 F). The Cannon Co, 32nd Inf Regt, received between fifty (50) and seventy five (75) rounds of Arty fire from Jap 75mm gun which was finally destroyed by Naval Gunfire. A Cub Plane of the 57th Bn was hit in the wing by a Jap 20mm AA shell. Neither the pilot nor the observer was injured and the plane was able to return to the landing field. Medical supplies were successfully dropped after a second attempt from an altitude of fifty (50) feet, to a patrol of the 17th Inf Regt which was pinned down by enemy machine gun fire and almost wiped out when advancing forward of the front lines. The

patrol was rescued after dark, assisted by a box barrage fired by the Arty. The 57th Bn fired Bn concentrations on two (2) separate groups of from twenty (20) to thirty (30) Japs in the open. These were the largest concentrations of enemy troops observed and the results of Arty fire were excellent. Precision adjustments were made on caves, tunnels and the reverse slopes of steep ridges from which the enemy continued to defend tenaciously. The 7th Div Arty Air Section flew a photographic mission, taking a series of verticals and obliques from an altitude of 2500 feet for the use of the Inf and Arty. Six (6) ships fired 16", 12", 8", and 5" projectiles against enemy installations with excellent results. One (1) Naval Spotting Plane was hit by enemy AA fire and completely destroyed. Arty ammunition expenditure was limited to 0.5 units of fire per day by XXIV Corps.

1 May 1945:

The 49th Bn reinforced by the 48th Bn, assumed direct support of the 184th Inf Regt. The 362nd FA Bn of the 96th Div Arty reinforced the fires of the 57th Bn in the sector of the 17th Inf Regt. The 1st Bn, 184th Inf Regt, successfully relieved the 1st Bn of the 32nd Inf Regt. The 1st Bn, 32nd Inf Regt, was unable to withdraw because of being flanked by enemy machine gun fire. The 363rd FA Bn of the 96th Div Arty reinforced the fires of the 31st Bn, being allowed three hundred (300) rounds per day during daylight for this purpose. Medium tanks, using direct fire against enemy emplacements from the vicinity of Hill 178 (8374 B), drew heavy enemy Arty fire, some of which fell on the Arty OPs. During the night of 1-2 May 1945, the enemy attempted to infiltrate through the front lines but was beaten back with the help of normal barrages fired throughout the night by the Arty.

2 May 1945:

The 49th Bn displaced to new position at 8576 E during the morning. The sky was overcast with low hanging clouds which limited visibility, restricted use of air observation, and limited deep Arty support furnished by the Navy. Seventy five (75) replacements for the 7th Div Arty were received and assigned to the Bns. One (1) round of HE-AT ammunition burst prematurely in tube of a 105mm Howitzer of Btry "C", 57th Bn, completely blowing off the end of the tube but causing no injury to any personnel. Co "L", 184th Inf Regt, attacked at 0230 and seized a small hill just short of Conical Hill (8271 G). By daylight the Co was surrounded by active enemy. The Co maintained its position during daylight but was forced to withdraw under cover of darkness and the protection of a box barrage. The FO with Co "L" was killed and other members of his party wounded by enemy mortar fire. The usual harassing, interdiction, and illumination missions were fired by two (2) ships of the Navy during the night and six (6) ships were available for counterbattery and for targets of opportunity throughout the day. Poor visibility limited amount of firing. As a result of sound and flash readings obtained by the 7th Div Arty, XXIV Corps Arty, and Inf OPs, numerous counterbattery missions were fired at night, silencing enemy Arty at least temporarily.

3 May 1945:

The Inf attempted to attack south in the Div sector but the attacks encountered such heavy resistance that the gains were measured in yards. The Arty continued to pound enemy defenses and exerted every effort to locate enemy Arty. Btry "A", 834th AAA (AW) Bn (Mobile), moved into the 7th Inf Div sector to provide AA protection to areas occupied by the Arty. The Air Section had seven (7) L-4 Planes operational and two (2) L-5 Planes were on hand but not assembled. At dusk, Air Observers discovered and took under fire enemy troops who were moving north from the southern end of the island. The enemy was extremely active during the night, laying down the heaviest concentration of fire on our front lines and on areas in front of our front lines, so far.

experienced. Observation at a flash base OP occupied by the 57th Bn had to be discontinued because of the heavy shelling, which hit the dug in OP, without causing any casualties. Observers at an OP on the seawall, manned by the 48th Bn, saw three (3) Jap barges approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles off shore at 2345, which were fired on by the Navy and sunk.

4 May 1945:

In the early hours of the morning the enemy launched a coordinated attack against our front lines, utilizing all means at his disposal. Fresh troops of the 24th Div, reinforced, assembled opposite the center of the 7th Inf Div and the left flank of the 77th Inf Div. Shipping Engr troops embarked in barges during the night at YONABARU with the mission of landing behind our front lines and destroying communications, Arty, and CPs. At the same time a small number of enemy planes succeeded in breaking through the night fighter screen and dropped anti-personnel and light fragmentation bombs near Inf CPs. The enemy attack was preceded by an extremely heavy Arty concentration. A large percentage of the rounds falling into areas occupied by our Arty were either duds or fired with a delay fuze which did little or no damage. At least eight (8) Japanese small boats were sunk on the left flank of the Div by fire from the 7th Rcn Trp and the Navy which effectively stopped the attempt at landing behind the 7th Inf Div. F0s discovered large groups of enemy assembling for the attack. These groups were effectively neutralized and the expected coordinated attack was broken up. Only small groups were able to infiltrate our front lines and by 0745 the main attack was definitely stopped. After the failure of the initial attack, disorganized groups of Japs, some without arms, were observed fleeing southward and these were taken under Arty fire for the remainder of the day. Both direct support Bns adjusted time fire on groups of the enemy in the open with devastating effect. Air Observers reported seeing many lucrative targets, consisting of enemy Arty in the open protected by AA guns. Enemy AA was particularly active against our observation planes in an attempt at preventing Air Observers from adjusting on Arty pieces, which had been moved into the open during the night in order to support the attack. The enemy was also utilizing smoke pots in an effort to conceal his Arty positions. An Air Observer was able to adjust the 31st Bn shortly after dawn on three (3) 75mm AA guns, scoring direct hits on two (2) of the guns before his target was obscured by smoke. The same observer also scored direct hits on two (2) Btries of 75mm guns. Arty OPs on Hill 178 (8374 B) received heavy shelling at night and throughout the day. One (1) man from the 57th Bn was killed by an enemy shell, which scored a direct hit on a wire truck he was riding. One (1) 1½-ton truck and one (1) $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck were hit by shell fragments at the position of the 57th Bn. Six (6) ships, with Air Spot, fired throughout the day and reported hitting eight (8) AA guns, twelve (12) Arty pieces, a number of trucks in the open, dumps, caves and personnel in the open. Arty observers reported scoring hits on a total of nine (9) AA guns, eighteen (18) field pieces, ammunition dumps, large groups of enemy in the open, and innumerable other targets. Many guns in caves were fired on with undetermined results. At the close of the period the front lines were unchanged. An estimated seventy five (75) to eighty (80) Japs succeeded in infiltrating into rear areas. Otherwise the enemy attack was totally unsuccessful.

5 May 1945:

Approximately one hundred fifty (150) Japs, armed with machine guns, mortars, and demolition charges, succeeded in getting through the 17th Inf Regt during the night. This party mined roads near TANABARU before withdrawing to the escarpment north of TANABARU where a patrol from the 17th Inf Regt was sent to clear them out. Another party of Japs infiltrated behind OPs on Hill 178 and to the OP manned by the 49th Bn on Skyline Ridge, where one (1) man of the Observer Party was killed by machine gun fire. The radio at the OP was destroyed before the Observer Party pulled out. One (1) man of the party slept

through the entire action. One (1) Okinawan soldier was killed and another was wounded and captured near Cub air strip. A Cub plane knocked off its landing gear by hitting a stump while taking off. It crash landed at KADENA air field without injury to pilot or observer. Front lines in the Div sector were not able to advance during the day. Enemy AA fire at friendly observation planes was not as active, and a number of profitable targets were fired upon, using Air Spot. Six (6) ships provided fire support in the Div sector, destroying AA guns and Arty pieces, besides firing at enemy caves, supply dumps, trucks and personnel in the open. Three (3) ships provided night illumination, harassing, interdiction, and counterbattery fires throughout the night.

6 May 1945:

Normal barrages were fired on Jap activity all along the front lines throughout the night. A patrol sent out from the 184th Inf Regt into area where normal barrage had been fired, reported locating three hundred fifty (350) dead Japs along with one (1) 75mm Pack Howitzer, one (1) 37mm Anti-Tank Gun, five (5) grenade dischargers, two (2) machine guns. A predominance of the dead were officers and non-commissioned officers. Another patrol located one hundred (100) dead Japs killed by an Arty concentration. The 17th Inf Regt attacked at 1230 to seize a hill in its front from which fire was holding up the 184th Inf Regt on the left. The 184th Inf Regt attacked at 1300 to seize GAJA Hill (8272 T). One (1) L-5 plane was operational and two (2) crated L-4 planes were received. Two (2) Battleships, one (1) Cruiser, and three (3) Destroyers provided Naval Gunfire for the 7th Inf Div during the day. Profitable targets were much less numerous than on the previous two (2) days. The 48th and 49th Bns began construction of bomb proof OPs near Skyline Ridge (8474 F). The Inf was able to send patrols forward freely and seize some hills to its front which had been defended tenaciously before the attack of 4 May 1945.

7 May 1945:

The 17th and 184th Inf Regts attacked in the morning following an Arty preparation in order to secure commanding terrain to the immediate front. The advance was halted by enemy machine gun and mortar fire before much progress was made. A large group of Japs apparently withdrawing from TANABARU attempted to get past the 3rd Bn, 17th Inf Regt. Arty fire broke up the group, killing at least forty seven (47) of the enemy. Air observation was excellent during the morning and Air Observers adjusted medium Arty on six (6) active AA guns, several Arty pieces, ammunition dumps in dugouts, troops in the open, and a fuel dump in a town. AA guns were camouflaged in grass huts and fired at Observation Planes flying within range. The 3rd Bn, 184th Inf Regt, succeeded in securing GAJA Hill (8272 T) in the afternoon. Visibility was poor in the afternoon when a light rain fell. The 362nd Bn, reinforcing the 57th Bn, displaced, and the 48th Bn took over reinforcing missions until displacement was completed. The 225th Bn and the 1st Mar 155mm Howitzer Bn reinforced the fires of the 57th Bn. Suitable Arty targets continued to be observed early in the morning and just before dusk at night. The Navy furnished six (6) ships, with Plane Spot, to fire on targets in the Div sector. Numerous profitable targets were located and taken under fire. Two (2) AA guns and eight (8) 75mm guns were definitely destroyed and several others fired on with undetermined results.

8 May 1945:

Orders received indicated that the 96th Inf Div would commence relieving the 7th Inf Div in its sector. One (1) light Bn of Arty was ordered to reinforce the Arty of the 96th Inf Div, and two (2) light Bns were ordered to reinforce the Arty of the 77th Inf Div. The medium Bn was ordered to fire in the sector of both the 96th and 77th Inf Divs as needed. Visibility was very poor

and a heavy rain grounded all planes for the day. The direct support Arty fired at enemy mortar positions on the reverse slopes of hills. One (1) man from the 57th Bn was killed when he accidentally set off a booby trap at his Btry position. The 921st FA Bn of the 96th Inf Div displaced into the sector of the 7th Inf Div. All FA pieces and the Navy fired one (1) volley at 1200 to celebrate the final capitulation of GERMANY. The Navy furnished six (6) ships with the mission of providing deep support in the 7th Inf Div sector. Harassing fires were provided during the day and night. No observed missions were fired because of poor visibility.

9 May 1945:

Visibility was excellent but the roads were barely passable as a result of the heavy rain of the previous day. The 382nd Inf Regt of the 96th Inf Div commenced relieving the 17th Inf Regt in its sector, and the relief was completed by 1800 at which time the 57th Bn was relieved of its direct support mission by the 362nd Bn and was assigned the mission of reinforcing the 304th Bn, 77th Inf Div. The 48th Bn reconnoitered for positions in the sector of the 77th Inf Div. The 49th Bn destroyed a single enemy Arty piece with its crew which opened up on the rear of the 184th Inf Regt from the vicinity of the Air Strip. The 184th Inf Regt was able to advance to the west slope of Conical Hill. The front lines of the 17th Inf Regt remained unchanged.

10 May 1945:

The 48th Bn displaced to 8177 X and was assigned the mission of reinforcing the fires of the 305th Bn of the 77th Inf Div. The 49th Bn was assigned the mission of reinforcing the fires of the 921st Bn which was in direct support of the 383rd Inf Regt 96th Inf Div. The 57th Bn was assigned the mission of reinforcing the fires of 304th Bn of the 77th Inf Div. The 31st Bn was assigned the mission of general support in the sector of the 77th and 96th Inf Divs with priority to the 77th Inf Div. The 96th Inf Div completed the relief of the 7th Inf Div at 1420.

11 - 21 May 1945:

The Inf of the 7th Inf Div was withdrawn from the front lines for the purpose of rehabilitation after forty (40) straight days of combat against the enemy. The Arty of the 7th Inf Div remained in action and was assigned the mission of reinforcing the Arty of the 96th and 77th Inf Divs. The 31st Bn was relieved of the mission of reinforcing the 77th Div Arty, 14 May 1945 and assigned the mission of reinforcing the 96th Div Arty exclusively. The 57th Bn reinforced the fires of the 304th Bn between 10 - 15 May 1945, the fires of the 902nd Bn, 15 - 16 May 1945, and the 362nd Bn, 16 - 21 May 1945. The 48th Bn displaced to 8177 X, 10 May 1945 from which position it reinforced the fires of the 305th Bn. The 49th Bn reinforced the fires of the 921st Bn. The 49th Bn displaced to 8174 E, 19 May 1945. The 31st and 57th Bns established OPs on Conical Hill and the 48th Bn established an OP on the escarpment at 8075 S in the sector of the 77th Inf Div. Hq Btry, 7th Div Arty, killed two (2) Japs in its CP, 17 May 1945. The 49th Bn received six (6) rounds of 5" Naval AA Shells in its area 20 May 1945. Eleven (11) men of the 7th Div Arty were sent back to the States under rotation policy and one (1) officer and twelve (12) enlisted men were sent back on temporary duty for forty five (45) days of rest and rehabilitation. The 57th Bn received five (5) new 105mm Howitzer tubes and the 48th Bn received one (1) to replace tubes worn out by the constant firing. By 20 May 1945, plans for the employment of the 7th Div Arty were completed. The 31st, 48th, and 49th Bns were to reinforce the fires of the 57th Bn which was to be in direct support of the 184th Inf Regt. When the 32nd Inf Regt was committed the 49th Bn was to furnish direct support, reinforced by the 31st and 48th Bns as well as the Corps Arty. The 7th Div Arty was relieved of its reinforcing missions effective 1800, 21 May 1945.

22 May 1945:

The 7th Inf Div signalized its return to combat by a pre-dawn attack without the usual Arty preparation. The maneuver caught the enemy completely off guard and two (2) Bns of the 184th Inf Regt were able to push through to the high ground south of YONABARU against meager resistance. Intermittent rain fell throughout the day, limiting visibility to a few thousand feet and grounding Ln Planes. Tanks could not be used over the cultivated fields and rice paddies which the enemy had literally sprinkled with various types of improvised mines. The 57th Bn had two (2) officers wounded by enemy mortar fire, only one (1) of whom had to be evacuated. One (1) Co of the 32nd Inf Regt pushed through, with the 184th Inf Regt on the right flank to cover the deployment of the 32nd Inf Regt in that sector when it was committed. Due to the inability of the 96th Inf Div to advance south and west on Conical Hill, the right flank of the 7th Inf Div was vulnerable to enemy fire from the high ground in that sector and limited the advance west of YONABARU. Two (2) Cruisers and two (2) Destroyers provided Naval Gunfire support for the 7th Inf Div during the day. Six (6) Rocket LCIs fired 1500 5" rockets in support of the attack. Enemy communication from front lines to Arty positions appeared to be inadequate because no enemy Arty fell on our front lines until hours after carrier pigeons were observed being released by the enemy. It was evident the enemy was unable to adjust his Arty because his shelling was sporadic and erratic.

23 May 1945:

The 184th Inf Regt continued its advance south and succeeded in seizing Bamboo Hill (8268 R). The 32nd Inf Regt moved into position and attacked south and west to seize the high ground south of SHURI and effect a junction with the Marines thereby cutting off SHURI from the south. The 49th Bn took over the mission of providing direct support to the 32nd Inf Regt. The 31st and 48th Bns were in general support. The 145th Bn of XXIV Corps Arty was given the mission of reinforcing the 7th Inf Div in place of the 225th Bn which was displacing. Ln Planes were able to fly throughout the morning but were grounded late in the afternoon because of poor visibility. Intermittent rains fell throughout the day. Four (4) ships with three (3) planes were available to the 7th Inf Div throughout the day and provided illumination and harassing fires throughout the night.

24 May 1945:

Weather cleared up but muddy roads hampered movement of troops and vehicles. Visibility was sufficient to enable Ln Planes to adjust Arty fire on profitable targets which usually appeared after dawn and just prior to dusk. One (1) officer from the 57th Bn died as a result of wounds sustained when hit by friendly strafing fire. Leaflets were dropped directing enemy civilians to move south dressed in white clothing. The 31st and 48th Bns established OPs on Juniper Hill (8368 F), south of YONABARU. The 32nd Inf Regt continued to receive fire from the southern slopes of Conical Hill. The 57th Bn had two (2) Howitzers out of action because of stripped lands and broken recoil mechanism. The Navy provided five (5) ships with Air Spot and two (2) groups of Rocket Boats.

25 May 1945:

Continued rains made roads nearly impassible; all movement was greatly restricted. Visibility was poor, but some air observation missions were flown. Normal Barrage fired by the 49th Bn stopped a Jap night attack on the 32nd Inf Regt. One (1) Co of the 184th Inf Regt on the escarpment at 8368 V managed to hold off a fierce Jap attack which was preceded by an intense mortar preparation. Arty fire succeeded in repulsing the attack, and the Inf held its position in spite of heavy casualties. Persistent Jap air attacks were made against

OKINAWA throughout the day. Friendly air succeeded in destroying over fifty (50) Jap planes of assorted make and model including one (1) bomber carrying a Jap suicide flying rocket. An enemy shell exploded an ammunition dump near the 48th Bn. The 57th Bn received about twenty (20) rounds of enemy Arty in its position with no damage inflicted. The 57th Bn had a 105mm Howitzer out of action because of stripped lands. It was replaced by the Ordnance with a tube from a medium tank. In addition to the 145th Bn, the 225th and 532nd Bns provided reinforcing fires against numerous enemy targets. The Navy provided five (5) ships for Naval Gunfire, and LCI Rocket Boats which covered the seaward slopes of the hills in the Div sector.

26 May 1945:

Heavy rains continued throughout the day grounding Arty Spotting Planes, causing roads to become barely passable and making the use of tanks impossible. The 32nd Inf Regt conducted extensive patrols to the west in an effort to locate enemy positions. The 184th Inf Regt attacked to the south on the Div left flank to seize high ground south of the escarpment. In spite of poor visibility, much enemy activities were observed. Several columns of Jap troops and trucks were taken under effective Arty fire while moving south. LCI Rocket Boats supported the advance of the 184th Inf Regt by neutralizing enemy positions along the shore, using 5" rockets. Five (5) ships provided Naval Gunfire support but poor visibility hampered activities. The 49th Bn was reinforced by the fires of the 31st, 225th, and 749th Bns throughout the day. One (1) Howitzer tube of the 57th Bn became unsafe to fire because of stripped lands. The Ordnance delivered one (1) new Howitzer to the 57th Bn to replace one (1) which had been out of action. Five (5) rounds of 150mm Arty fire fell in the area of the 57th Bn, causing no damage.

27 May 1945:

The rains continued, the visibility was poor, the Inf moved forward to destroy isolated groups of Japs in caves in its push south. All Observers reported observing movements of the enemy, including tanks pulling Arty pieces. Ten (10) Bns of Arty were fired on an estimated five hundred (500) Japs moving south. Excellent results were reported. The 184th Inf Regt sent patrols a thousand yards forward of the front lines against meager opposition. The 32nd Inf Regt encountered intense mortar and machine gun fire as the enemy made every effort to halt the push westward which threatened to cut off his retreat from his SHURI position. The 48th and 57th Bns were ordered to displace to the vicinity of YONABARU. Btry "B", 48th Bn, completed its displacement to 8370 O by 1600 over nearly impassable roads. The Navy furnished four (4) ships for Naval Gunfire and two (2) LCI Gunboats which made a reconnaissance of the shoreline of the CHINEN Peninsula adjusting Naval Gunfire on caves and emplacements. Small caliber air bursts fell in the areas of the 48th and 57th Bns during the night. The 48th Bn had one (1) Howitzer out of action because of damaged lands. Ln Planes were able to fly six (6) missions during the day.

28 May 1945:

The Inf continued extensive patrolling to its fronts and the 184th Inf Regt was able to advance south in its sector. The remainder of the 48th Bn completed its displacement to 8371 Q. The 57th Bn displaced to 8372 X. The skies were overcast and occasional showers fell throughout the day. Visibility was limited to several hundred feet, curtailing the use of Ln Planes which were able to fly only four (4) missions. The 17th Inf Regt displaced one (1) Bn south of YONABARU. The 57th Bn had one (1) Howitzer out of action because of stripped lands. An Observer from the 49th Bn fired three (3) Bns on an estimated five hundred (500) Japs in the open, causing at least seventy five percent (75%) casualties among the enemy. The Navy provided four (4) ships for Naval Gunfire. One (1) Navy Spotting Plane was badly damaged by enemy AA fire but managed to return to its ship. Most of the spotting missions for the Navy were adjusted by High Performance Plane because the low ceiling forced the planes to fly too close to the ground where effective small arms fire endangered the slow flying Observation Plane.

29 May 1945:

Strong wind and heavy rains hampered operations against the enemy. The Inf continued extensive patrolling to locate enemy dispositions. The 7th Rcn Trp dispatched a patrol along coast of CHINEN Peninsula in the sector of the 184th Inf Regt without encountering any well organized enemy opposition. Btry "B", 48th Bn, displaced to position just north of YONABARU occupied by remainder of Bn. The 7th Div Arty CP displaced to 8476 I and the new CP opened at 1100. The 57th Bn established an OP at 8367 A. All Ln Planes were grounded throughout the day. The 48th Bn discovered mines in its Bn area and one (1) man was wounded slightly when hit by fragments from an enemy Arty shell which fell in the Bn area. Observers from the 31st Bn adjusted the 8" Howitzers on three (3) 150mm guns which were reported destroyed by direct hits. The Navy provided five (5) ships and one (1) LCI for shore bombardment in the sector of the 7th Inf Div.

30 May 1945:

The 32nd Inf Regt resumed its attack west toward Mable Hill (8063 G). The 17th Inf Regt completed its move to assembly areas in rear of the 32nd Inf Regt and 184th Inf Regt. The 184th Inf Regt straightened out its lines in preparation for continuing its attack to the south. The 7th Rcn Trp sent patrols to locate enemy dispositions, and encountered very few Japs. The 96th Inf Div finally began to move forward in its sector, thus clearing the way for the 32nd Inf Regt to advance to Mable Hill. The 49th Bn was ordered to displace to the vicinity of YONABARU, 31 May 1945, and the 48th Bn took over the mission of providing direct support to the 32nd Inf Regt during the displacement. Visibility was so poor planes were not able to operate throughout the day. The Navy provided five (5) ships and one (1) LSM to provide fire support to the 7th Inf Div. Their use was limited to harassing fire due to lack of visibility. One (1) officer of the 57th Bn was seriously injured by a Jap grenade which fell at his feet after he had killed a Jap soldier hiding in the vicinity of an OP manned by the 57th Bn. The 57th Bn received a new tube to replace one which had been out of action.

31 May 1945:

The 7th Inf Div patrolled to the southeast, south and southwest. The 32nd Inf Regt attacked at 0910 to seize Mable Hill (8063 G) to the west. Mable Hill was secured by 1310. The 77th and 96th Inf Divs reached their objectives. The 96th Inf Div received orders to take over the sector occupied by the 32nd Inf Regt and to continue the attack south. The 17th Inf Regt went into position on Hill 106 (8267 U) and Hill 69 (8167 V) relieving elements of the 32nd and 184th Inf Regts in that sector. XXIV Corps Arty reinforced the fires of the 7th Div Arty. Btry "B", 49th Bn, completed its displacement to YONABARU (8270 Y). One (1) officer of the 49th Bn was killed by a fragment from an enemy mortar shell passing through his heart while he was in his foxhole. One (1) other man was wounded. Visibility was excellent in the morning and nine (9) missions were flown by the Ln Planes. Planes were grounded in the afternoon due to lack of visibility. Five (5) ships and two (2) LSMs provided Naval Gunfire support for the 7th Inf Div during the day.

1 June 1945:

The 32nd Inf Regt was relieved by elements of the 96th Inf Div and reverted to Div reserve. The 48th Bn was relieved of furnishing direct support to the 32nd Inf Regt and was assigned the mission of direct support to the 17th Inf Regt. The 17th Inf Regt attacked in column of Bns and succeeded in capturing Hills 75 (8266 F) and 88 (8266 I) against slight opposition. By nightfall the 17th Inf Regt had secured Hill 117 (8266 U). Btry "A", 31st Bn, displaced to 8270 Y. Btry "A", 49th Bn, displaced to 8270 P. Due to poor visibility, Ln Planes were not able to fly in the morning. Five (5) missions were flown.

in the afternoon. XXIV Corps Arty increased the allowance of ammunition authorized to be expended to 0.5 units of fire. However with the roads rapidly becoming impassible, ammunition supply was becoming critical. The Navy promised to unload an LCT of ammunition at YONABARU, but between Red Alerts and a sporadic shelling of YONABARU, no LCT ventured to beach. The 419th FA Gp was relieved of reinforcing the 7th Div Arty. The 225th Bn was assigned the mission of reinforcing the 7th Div Arty while the 145th Bn was assigned the mission of reinforcing the 7th Div Arty and 96th Div Arty with priority to the 96th Div Arty. The Navy furnished six (6) ships and five (5) LCI Rocket Boats. The LCIs sailing around the southern end of the island fired rockets, 40mm and 20mm guns at enemy activities along the coast denying the Japs the use of coast roads.

2 June 1945:

The 17th Inf Regt drove southeast against meager resistance to capture Hill 175 (8364 B). Further advance was stopped by effective automatic small arms fire from Hill 152 (8464 B). The 184th Inf Regt drove south to capture Squirrel Hill (8465 X) and Walnut Hill (8565 L). The 32nd Inf Regt moved to an assembly area near SHINZATO (8466 S) in preparation for initiating a drive east along CHINEN-MURA Peninsula. The 57th Bn displaced its OP to Hill 181 (8366 H). Btry "C", 49th Bn succeeded in reaching the coast road at 8882 I where it was forced to remain because of impassible roads. Btry "B", 31st Bn, finally succeeded in arriving at 8269 R, late at night after having been enroute all day. It took two (2) M-5 tractors in tandem two and one half ($\frac{1}{2}$) hours to get one (1) 155mm Howitzer to the road. The road north of YONABARU was given up by the Engrs as being impossible to be maintained. The 57th Bn had two (2) Howitzer tubes out of action because of stripped lands. Poor visibility and intermittent rains limited the use of Ln Planes to three (3) missions. A few sporadic rounds of enemy Arty fell in the front lines, causing little damage. The Navy provided six (6) ships and five (5) LCIs which fired on numerous targets of opportunity including troop concentrations, a large blockhouse, numerous tunnels and caves. Illumination and harassing fires were provided during the night.

3 June 1945:

The 7th Inf Div continued with its mission of clearing out the enemy in its zone of action. The 32nd Inf Regt was ordered to drive to the southeast coast and to seize the CHINEN-MURA Peninsula. The 184th Inf Regt was assigned the mission of driving to the south and then moving southwest along the southern coast of OKINAWA. The 17th Inf Regt, maintaining contact with the 96th Inf Div on its right, was ordered to drive southeast to seize Hill 197 (8364 S) after which it was to turn southwest. Because of poor visibility aerial observation was limited to two (2) missions. The Ln Planes flew five (5) courier missions and two (2) supply drop missions. Btries "A" and "B", 49th Bn, displaced to 8469 K. The remainder of the 49th Bn, was still enroute. Btry "A", 31st Bn displaced to 8269 P. Btry "B", 31st Bn, went into action at 8269 R. Btry "A", 57th Bn, displaced to 8466 N. The coast road leading into YONABARU was closed to all traffic as the continued rains had made the road impassible.

4 June 1945:

The 17th Inf Regt drove the enemy out of MEGA (8163) and secured Hill 138 (8363 K) and Hill 132 (8263 J). The 32nd Inf Regt completed the capture of CHINEN-MURA Peninsula against disorganized resistance. The 184th Inf Regt pushed forward to secure the important MINATOGA-MEGA Road and the vital MINATOGA Inlet. The 57th Bn, less Btry "A", displaced to 8466 N. The 31st Bn established a new Flash OP at 8364 W. Intermittent rains and poor visibility limited the Ln Planes to one (1) courier mission and two (2) observation missions. Four (4) enemy trucks and two (2) field pieces were damaged and two (2) trucks and two (2)

tanks were destroyed by fires of the 48th and 145th Bns. The Navy provided four (4) ships and five (5) LCIs in support of the 7th Inf Div which fired on small groups of troops, tanks and trucks. Night harassing missions were fired throughout the night.

5 June 1945:

The 17th Inf Regt drove through ARAGUSUKU (8162) and secured Hill 93 (8161 D) following an effective Arty concentration. The 184th Inf Regt assisted the 17th Inf Regt in securing Hill 93 and continued the advance to secure hill mass at 8161 FGL. The 32nd Inf Regt continued mopping up operations in the CHINEN-MURA Peninsula. The 48th Bn, less Btry "B", began displacing to the vicinity of FUNAKUSHI (8264 N) over almost impassable roads. Btry "C", 31st Bn, commenced displacing by section to 8374 U. By nightfall it had succeeded in pulling one (1) 155mm Howitzer several hundred yards to the road. The 49th Bn was relieved of providing direct support to the 32nd Inf Regt and assigned the mission of reinforcing the fires of the 57th Bn. During the displacement of the 48th Bn, the 57th Bn was assigned the mission of providing direct support of the 17th Inf Regt. Rain and poor visibility hampered observation by Ln Planes. Two (2) reconnaissance missions, four (4) propaganda leaflet drop missions and six (6) mail and supply drop missions were flown. Four (4) ships and five (5) LCIs provided Naval Gunfire for the 7th Inf Div. Over five hundred (500) rounds of 5" ammunition were placed on the eastern slopes of the escarpment in the sector of the 184th Inf Regt.

6 June 1945:

The 17th Inf Regt drove to the outskirts of TOMUI (7964) and consolidated gains ranging from five hundred (500) yards on the left flank to eight hundred (800) yards on the right flank. The 184th Inf Regt, with two Bns abreast, resumed determined drive southwest against stiff enemy opposition. The 32nd Inf Regt patrolled the CHINEN-MURA Peninsula rounding up civilians hiding in caves. The 48th Bn took over direct support missions of 17th Inf Regt. Btry "B", 57th Bn, displaced to new positions near TOYAMA (8361 O). The 155mm Howitzer Bns of XXIV Corps Arty could not furnish support to the 7th Inf Div because they were out of range. The road north of YONABARU was totally impassable to all vehicles. Ammunition and supplies had to be unloaded at YONABARU from small boats. The visibility was excellent with the sun shining for the first time in days. The Ln Planes flew two (2) mail drop missions, two (2) special reconnaissance missions, and eight (8) observation missions. One (1) Cruiser, two (2) Destroyers, and five (5) LCIs provided Naval Gunfire support during the day, firing on personnel in the open, heavily fortified emplacements and one (1) 75mm gun which was being moved.

7 June 1945:

The 17th Inf Regt registered moderate gains against tenacious enemy groups defending from extremely well constructed positions. The 184th Inf Regt pushed the enemy out of GUSHICHAN (8160) and wiped out pockets of resistance on Hill 53 (8260 L). The 32nd Inf Regt, in Division reserve, patrolled the CHINEN-MURA Peninsula. Elements of the 32nd Inf Regt landed on O-SHIMA (8461) completing seizure of that island. Btry "B", 48th Bn, displaced to 8264 M. 57th Bn, less Btry "B", displaced to 8361 O. Btry "A", 49th Bn displaced to 8361 T. The remaining three (3) Bns of the 96th Div Arty displaced south. One (1) Btry of 8" Howitzers and one (1) Bn of 155mm Howitzers displaced south to positions from which they were within effective Arty range. One (1) platoon of Btry "C", 31st Bn, was in position and ready to fire near Hill 178. One (1) officer with a FO Party from the 57th Bn was wounded. Visibility was fair and the Ln Planes flew two (2) supply drop missions, one (1) mail drop mission, three (3) reconnaissance missions and thirteen (13) observation missions. Considerable enemy Arty fell in the front lines of the Inf. Three (3) ships and five (5) LCIs

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HILL 25 (8159 B)



~~DECLASSIFIED~~
AIR STRIP
7TH INF DIV ARTY
(8361 XY)

Photos by 7th Div Arty Air Sec.

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provided Naval Gunfire support. Targets fired on consisted of small groups of troops, trucks and supplies. The LCIs providing close support to the left flank of the 184th Inf Regt were fired on by enemy mortars and machine guns.

8 June 1945:

Against intense enemy resistance, the 17th Inf Regt pushed forward to the TOMUI-GUSHICHAN Road and the adjacent valley. The 184th Inf Regt consolidated minor gains in its sector against desperate enemy resistance. The terrain in enemy hands was particularly well suited for defense. Excellent observation and fields of fire from the base, sides and top of the YAEJU-DAKE escarpment limited the attacker to minor gains after a large expenditure of Arty ammunition. The enemy had constructed virtually impregnable defenses consisting of concrete pillboxes beneath coral outcropping and boulders which Arty fire could not destroy without an exorbitant expenditure of ammunition. The terrain had apparently been used by the Japs as a training and demonstration area for all types of field fortifications. The soft ground following the heavy rains precluded the use of tanks until the ground dried up and the roads became usable. The 32nd Inf Regt began relieving the 184th Inf Regt and completed the relief by dusk. The 49th Bn, less Btry "A", displaced to 8361 T from which position it took over direct support of the 32nd Inf Regt. The 57th Bn was assigned the mission of providing reinforcing fires to the 49th Bn. The weather was clear but visibility over the target area was restricted by low flying clouds and smoke from Arty shelling. The Air Section flew one (1) mail drop mission, two (2) photo drop missions, one (1) reconnaissance mission, and thirteen (13) observation missions. Three (3) ships and five (5) LCIs provided Naval Gunfire support. An estimated two hundred (200) Japs were decimated by a ten (10) minute five (5) gun salvo which caught them as they were emerging from a group of caves. A tremendous explosion which blew away part of a ridge occurred when fire was adjusted on a large cave. Two (2) small field pieces were destroyed.

9 June 1945:

In bitter fighting beneath the enemy held YAEJU-DAKE escarpment, the 17th Inf Regt scored moderate but important gains against heavy resistance. The 32nd Inf Regt launched an attack at 0730 which encountered accurate enemy fire of all types from commanding enemy positions on the escarpment and Hill 95 (8159 B). The 184th Inf Regt, in Div reserve, commenced patrolling and mopping up operations in rear of the front lines. The visibility continued fair and the Ln Planes flew one (1) mail drop mission, one (1) photo drop mission and thirteen (13) observation missions. Four (4) ships and five (5) LCIs provided Naval Gunfire. A heavy preparation was placed on Hill 95 prior to Inf attack. One (1) 75mm gun, one (1) larger caliber gun, three (3) machine guns and six (6) trucks were destroyed.

10 June 1945:

The 17th Inf Regt engaged in savage fighting throughout the day and made only limited gains. The 32nd Inf Regt, by utilizing flame thrower tanks and supporting weapons, inflicted severe casualties on the enemy. Flame throwing tanks utilizing new type extension hoses fired into cave openings and apertures which drove the defenders into the open where they were annihilated by rifle fire at point blank range. The 7th Div Arty CP displaced to 8361 M by utilizing LVTs to move along the beach from TSUNA to YONABARU and then by truck to new position. One (1) XXIV Corps Bn of 155mm howitzers displaced to positions from which it was able to furnish Arty support to the 7th Inf Div. Btry "A", 31st Bn, displaced to 8464 F. The 57th Bn captured a Jap Sergeant in its Bn area. Ammunition and other supplies began arriving at MINATOGA Inlet which greatly simplified the ammunition supply situation. All Bns had been dangerously low on ammunition. Construction was started on a Cub Air Strip in the vicinity of

the 7th Div Arty CP. The visibility was poor with a light mist falling throughout the day. The Air Section flew one (1) mail pickup mission, one (1) photo mission for the Div, three (3) photo drop missions, one (1) ration drop mission, and two (2) observation missions. The Navy provided two (2) Cruisers, one (1) Destroyer, and five (5) LCIs. A large fuel and ammunition dump was destroyed. The LCIs patrolled the coast line along the southern tip of the island, denying the use of the coast road to the enemy and firing on worthwhile targets.

11 June 1945:

The 17th Inf Regt gained one hundred fifty (150) yards after a relentless pounding by all weapons of enemy positions at the foot of the escarpment. The 32nd Inf Regt, culminating two (2) days of fierce assault, gained four hundred (400) yards on its left flank and succeeded in occupying the crest of Hill 95 (8159 B) which was the eastern anchor of the enemy's position on the escarpment. Utilizing flame throwing tanks, Hill 95 was thoroughly burned off, enabling the Inf to reach the top where they were immediately counterattacked by over thirty (30) Japs who were beaten off. The 184th Inf Regt, in Div reserve, sent one (1) Co to MINATOGA for the purpose of defending supply installations located there. The 31st Bn succeeded in moving all three (3) firing Btries to vicinity of SHIKIMBARU (8461). This was the first time in weeks that the Bn had all three (3) Btries together. The Cub Air Strip was usable, with work being continued on lengthening the strip. Heavy overcast seriously limited air observation although ground observation was excellent. The Air Section flew two (2) mail drop missions and six (6) observation missions. Two (2) Cruisers and two (2) Destroyers stood off southeast coast, furnishing night harassing fires and illumination missions. Five (5) LCI Gunboats supported advance of 32nd Inf Regt by firing on caves and personnel in heavily fortified positions along the coast. The LCIs destroyed a small boat filled with Japs at dawn. During the day, one (1) Battleship, two (2) Cruisers, one (1) Destroyer, and five (5) LCIs provided Naval Gunfire.

12 June 1945:

In a predawn attack, the 17th Inf Regt caught the enemy by surprise and succeeded in seizing a portion of the YAEJU-DAKE Escarpment before the enemy was able to recover. The 32nd Inf Regt resumed its attack against heavily fortified enemy positions, battering these positions with all supporting and organic weapons. The enemy was increasingly active at night, attempting to infiltrate our front lines with little success. Ground observation was good, but air observation was hampered by low overcast. One (1) photo mission, one (1) mail drop mission, and four (4) observation missions were flown throughout the day. The Air Section began operating from new Cub Air Strip. The 57th Bn killed one (1) Jap attempting to infiltrate into Bn area and located two (2) others at daylight who were killed resisting arrest. A termite patrol of the 48th Bn killed four (4) Jap soldiers and one (1) woman dressed in uniform who threw grenades at the patrol, slightly wounding two (2) men. The 31st Bn rounded up approximately fifty (50) civilians in its area. Enemy 150mm rounds fell in the front lines of the 32nd Inf Regt. One (1) Battleship, one (1) Cruiser, and two (2) Destroyers provided Naval Gunfire support. In addition, five (5) LCIs patrolled the coast of south tip of the island.

13 June 1945:

In an aggressive day-long attack, the 17th Inf Regt drove forward five hundred (500) yards on its right to seize a portion of the YAEJU-DAKE Escarpment. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy in driving a wedge into his main defensive position. The 32nd Inf Regt, on the Div left flank, gained up to six hundred (600) yards, utilizing flame thrower tanks and medium tanks to drive the enemy into the open where he was annihilated by small arms and machine gun fire. The enemy's reaction to gains by the 7th Inf Div was instant and

violent. He launched a counterattack with about three hundred (300) troops against the 32nd Inf Regt on Hill 95 and another counterattack against the 17th Inf Regt in an effort to dislodge our troops from the escarpment. Effective Arty fire stopped the enemy in every case before he was able to advance far. High explosive shells with instantaneous fuzes burst in the coral rocks with devastating effect against troops in the open. The Air Section flew two (2) photo drop missions, and three (3) observation missions. The new Air Strip at 8361 XY was placed in operation and the old strip was abandoned. Four (4) ships and five (5) LCIs supported the advance of the 7th Inf Div by firing on caves, personnel and enemy installations. The 31st Bn established an OP at 8365 Al. Two (2) Howitzers of the 48th Bn were out of action because of stripped lands. One (1) officer and one (1) enlisted man of a 49th Bn FO Party were wounded in action. Three (3) officers and six (6) enlisted men of the 57th Bn were burned seriously when a pile of extra powder charges caught fire at a Btry position.

14 June 1945:

The 17th Inf Regt made a general advance of two hundred (200) to five hundred (500) yards to occupy strong positions on ridge extending southeast from Laura Hill (7861 OT). The 32nd Inf Regt continued the relentless pounding of enemy installations with tanks and Arty to gain two hundred (200) to five hundred (500) yards. The enemy held an especially strong finger-like escarpment at 8260 L - 8159 A with nearly vertical cliffs which extended into the sector of the 32nd Inf Regt and from which flanking fire could be brought to bear on the right flank of the 32nd Inf Regt and the entire front of the 17th Inf Regt, advancing uphill against the coral strewn YAEJU-DAKE escarpment. The 225th Bn reinforcing the fires of the 7th Div Arty displaced to 8266 N. The 145th Bn was relieved of reinforcing the 7th Div Arty. The 48th Bn had one (1) man of a FO Party killed in action. 7th Div Arty Observers adjusted the fire of XXIV Corps Arty on numerous profitable targets requiring heavier Arty. The Navy furnished one (1) Battleship, one (1) Cruiser, two (2) Destroyers, five (5) LCIs and two (2) LSMs which supported the 7th Inf Div by firing on all enemy activity observed and denied the enemy the use of roads along the coast. In Planes flew eight (8) missions. The visibility was good after 1000 but there was an overcast over the target area.

15 June 1945:

The 17th Inf Regt advanced from four hundred (400) yards on the left flank to 1200 yards on the right flank utilizing tanks and portable flame throwers which drove the enemy into the open. The 32nd Inf Regt, utilizing medium tanks, flame thrower tanks and demolitions to burn and blast the enemy from extensive positions defending approaches to Hill 115 (7958 D), gained six hundred (600) yards and consolidated its positions for the night on the eastern slopes of Hill 115 (7958 D). The 1st Bn, 184th Inf Regt, moved to assembly area in rear of the 17th Inf Regt to provide defense in depth. The 48th Bn killed one (1) Jap during night in its area. The 57th Bn killed one (1) Jap during the night off the reef near its area. The 57th Bn received four (4) new 105mm tubes to replace four (4) which were worn out. The Air Section flew sixteen (16) missions. The visibility was good over the coast line to about 1000 yards inland. The Navy provided one (1) Battleship, one (1) heavy Cruiser, two (2) Destroyers, five (5) LCIs and two (2) LSMs and provided preparation, harassing, close and deep support fires for the 7th Inf Div. Illuminating missions were fired throughout the night.

16 June 1945:

The 17th Inf Regt advanced 1200 yards on its left flank and four hundred (400) yards on its right flank to seize the forward slopes of Hill 153 (7859 BG) and high ground adjacent thereto. The 32nd Inf Regt attacked southwest along

the seaward side gaining approximately 1000 yards to seize the dominating Hill 115 (7958 D). The 226th FA Bn (155mm Gun) moved into position at 8168 D and became available on call to the 7th Div Arty. XXIV Corps Arty harassed heavily an area southwest of the line 7759 K3 - 8057 L1. Air Section flew eighteen (18) missions. The Navy furnished one (1) Battleship, one (1) Cruiser and two (2) Destroyers which provided preparation, harassing, close and deep supporting fire in support of the 7th Inf Div. One (1) Navy spotting plane was shot down over enemy held territory and the pilot and radio operator were observed parachuting down. They were not recovered. An LCI managed to convince one (1) Jap to swim out to the ship from shore. He was able to furnish valuable information upon being questioned.

17 June 1945:

With the 17th Inf Regt on the right and the 32nd Inf Regt on the left, the 7th Inf Div launched an attack at 0700. The 17th Inf Regt advanced two hundred (200) yards pushing the enemy from the southern slopes of Hill 153 (7959 G) and began clearing the enemy from the top of Hill 153. The 32nd Inf Regt succeeded in eliminating several pockets of enemy resistance on the southern slope of Hill 115 (7958 D). The 184th Inf Regt completed relief of the 17th Inf Regt by 1730 at which time the 17th Inf Regt withdrew to an assembly area in rear of the front lines. The 48th Bn was relieved of direct support mission of the 17th Inf Regt and was assigned the mission of furnishing direct support to the 184th Inf Regt. The Air Section flew twenty (20) missions during the day. Planes from Tenth Army used the Air Strip for evacuating seriously wounded cases to hospitals in the rear. The Navy provided one (1) Battleship, one (1) Cruiser, two (2) Destroyers, five (5) LCI Rocket Ships and six (6) LCI Mortar Ships to provide supporting, night illumination and harassing fires for the 7th Inf Div.

18 June 1945:


The 32nd Inf Regt, with the 3rd Bn on the right and the 2nd Bn on the left, gained nine hundred (900) yards and seized the high ground of Hill 110 (7958 K). The 184th Inf Regt, with the 1st Bn on the right and the 3rd Bn on the left, gained seven hundred (700) yards across the front. A twenty four (24) plane air strike dropped twenty four (24) 1000-pound bombs on Hill 89 (7956 AB) which according to prisoner of war interrogation reports contained a deep natural cave containing the Jap 32nd Army Hq. The Navy pounded the same area with eighty eight (88) 1500-pound 14" shells. Considerable damage was inflicted on the coral rocks but the Jap Army Commander could not be persuaded to surrender. The 31st Bn established a new OP at 7859 N3. The Air Section flew fifteen (15) missions during the day. Visibility was obstructed by dust and smoke of concentrated Arty, Naval Gunfire, and air strikes. The 48th Bn had one (1) officer of a FO Party slightly wounded in action. The 57th Bn killed three (3) Japs in their battalion area during the night. Attempts of Japs to infiltrate positions occupied by the Arty from the ocean and by land during the night continued, which resulted in a large expenditure of small arms ammunition and flares by troops bivouacked in the immediate vicinity. The Navy provided one (1) Battleship, two (2) Cruisers, and one (1) Destroyer during the night, and one (1) Battleship, one (1) Cruiser, two (2) Destroyers, five (5) LCI Rocket Ships, and six (6) LCI Mortar Ships which bombarded the remainder of the 7th Inf Div zone of action. A loud speaker system was installed in an LCI which bombarded the enemy held shore with exhortations by a Jap interpreter in an endeavor to get the Jap soldiers and civilians to surrender. Several prisoners did surrender as a result of this appeal.

19 June 1945:

The 7th Inf Div continued its attack to the southwest, burning and blasting out enemy pockets of resistance in its methodical advance to the coast. Enemy infiltrators and by-passed Japs were particularly active during the night.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED



HILL 89 (7956 AB)



HILL 89 (7956 AB)

Photos by 7th Div Arty Air Sec.

SECRET

One medium tank was disabled when it received two (2) direct hits from an enemy 75mm gun. The 7th Div Arty provided normal harassing, direct support and general support missions reinforced by the medium Bns of XXIV Corps Arty. The 48th Bn brought down a particularly effective concentration of Arty fire on a large group of the enemy seemingly assembling for an attack, and dispersed the group before their intentions could be fully determined. The heavy concentration of Arty available to the 7th Inf Div precluded any possibility of the enemy's launching a final "Banzai" attack. The Air Section flew fifteen (15) missions during the day. A loud speaker mounted in an LCI was used successfully to induce over 5000 civilians and a few soldiers to surrender. The steady stream of Japs passing through the front lines seriously interfered with the advance of the Inf. The 57th Bn killed one (1) Jap; the 48th Bn killed one (1) Jap, and the 31st Bn killed three (3) Japs armed with hand grenades. Two (2) Cruisers and a Destroyer stood off shore to provide Naval Gunfire. A large number of white phosphorous shells were fired into cave openings along the shore. All heavy ships had to stop firing at 1400 because the target area was too limited for Naval Gunfire.

20 June 1945:

Eighteen (18) Bns of FA, firing five (5) volleys per Howitzer, brought down on Hill 89 (7956 AB) twenty-two (22) tons of steel and high explosives at 0730 with devastating effect. The fire was repeated again at 0745 for the benefit of any Japs who might have manned their defensive positions after escaping the first hail of steel. The Inf preceded by tanks followed up the Arty to move up to the northeast slopes of Hill 89. The Japs, hiding in tall grass, tangled undergrowth, beneath and behind coral boulders and outcropping, waited until the Inf was within point blank range before opening fire after which they stood up in plain view to be killed for the greater glory of their Emperor. Some of the Japs were armed only with grenades, sharpened sticks and bayonets but still they resisted to the death. The 32nd Inf Regt was able to advance its left flank with the aid of tanks and flamethrowers. However on its right flank the resistance encountered from well concealed disorganized pockets of resistance made the advance slow and costly. The 184th Inf Regt aided by the concentrated fire of four (4) Bns of 7th Div Arty on enemy troops at MABUNI, advanced over 1000 yards to secure the general line 7757 A - 7757 O. By late afternoon the MEDEERA-MABUNI Road was secured and patrols had advanced to the beach. The 17th Inf Regt patrolled the 7th Inf Div rear area, sent elements to protect the right flank of the 184th Inf Regt, which was exposed because of the failure of the 96th Inf Div to advance, and sent other troops to fill in gaps between the front line Bns of the 32nd Inf Regt. Corps Arty and Naval Gunfire could no longer be fired without endangering friendly troops, as the enemy still clung to a thin strip of shore line. By the end of the day the 7th Inf Div had secured Hill 89 and established contact with elements of the 1st Mar Div on its right. Loudspeaker broadcasts from the front lines and an LCI patrol ship were effective in inducing many Jap soldiers and civilians to move through the front lines to surrender. The 49th Bn killed seven (7) Japs, wounded two (2) and captured one (1) at the shore line during the night. The 48th Bn had one (1) officer of a FO Party wounded. The Air Section flew twenty two (22) missions including the evacuation of three (3) seriously wounded men to hospitals in the rear.

21 June 1945:

Organized enemy resistance on OKINAWA ended 21 June 1945, with the capture, by the 7th Inf Div of Hill 89 (7956 A), containing the cave from which the CG of the Japanese 32nd Army conducted the final defense of OKINAWA and in front of which he committed "Hara-Kiri" in apology to his Emperor for his failure. The battle was finished just eighty ~~two~~ (82) days after the initial landings by American troops on the beaches near KADENA and YONTAN Airfields. All organized resistance was at an end with many Japs, soldiers and civilians, still hiding in caves which had been overrun. The campaign entered into its final mopping up phase with the 7th Inf Div searching out innumerable caves, killing those Japs

who refused to surrender, and rounding up hundreds of civilians and soldiers. Encircled pockets of resistance still remained to be reduced with smoke grenades, satchel charges, and flame throwers. The 7th Div Arty was unable to fire on the enemy without endangering friendly troops. The 31st Bn killed two (2) Japs and captured three (3) others while cleaning up on an area formerly occupied at 8476 N. The 48th Bn captured two (2) Jap soldiers. The 49th Bn killed two (2) Jap soldiers moving along the coast during the night. The 57th Bn killed one (1) Jap soldier and captured one (1).

22 June 1945:

The Inf engaged in mopping up operations in the MABUNI (7957 P) - Hill 89 (7956 A) area. The 57th Bn fired a pre-dawn preparation into the heavily wooded area in the sector of the 32nd Inf Regt which was heavily infested with disorganized snipers making their final stand. These were the last rounds of Arty to be fired at the enemy on the Island of OKINAWA. The Arty of the 7th Inf Div had fired 257,411 rounds of ammunition in support of the Inf; a total of 5672 tons of steel and high explosive.

23 - 30 June 1945:

Officially the fighting was announced as having ended 21 June 1945, but there still remained extensive mopping up operations to be conducted. The stubborn, fanatical enemy remained in caves during the day and attempted to infiltrate through friendly troops during darkness in order to assemble in the northern end of the island for the purpose of conducting guerrilla operations against out troops. Thousands of civilians in pitiful condition were rounded up and moved to rear areas where medical aid and care could be administered. The 7th Inf Div, with the three (3) Inf Regts and the Arty troops of 7th Div Arty in line, commenced a sweep to the northeast coast of the CHINEN-MURA Peninsula, hunting out hiding Jap soldiers lurking in caves and ravines. All enemy supplies and equipment were gathered up and all caves and military installations covered up or destroyed. During this mop up, 7th Div Arty captured eight (8) Japanese soldiers, one (1) Japanese laborer, and one (1) female nurse. Forty three (43) enemy were killed and one hundred seventy three (173) caves were closed.

IX. COMMENTS AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONS.

ASSAULT ON BEACH

The assault landing was preceded by Naval Gunfire and air bombardment preparations on the landing beaches, commencing at dawn, 1 April 1945. On close approach of the landing craft, the Naval Gunfire moved inland and provided neutralization fires until Shore Fire Control Parties assumed control.

LCI Gunboats, Mortar Boats, and Rocket Boats preceded the leading wave, covering the beaches with 40mm gunfire, rockets and mortars.

The 776th Amph Tk Bn formed the leading wave and provided direct fire coming ashore.

The 776th Amph Tk Bn moved inland approximately two hundred (200) yards and continued to give direct fire support until the Inf had passed through the tanks. At this time the tanks took hull down positions, with the mission of direct support Arty, prepared to furnish fire through the Arty FOs.

The landing was successfully and efficiently executed.

ARTILLERY SUPPORT

The Field Artillery provided direct support for each Inf Bn. Reinforcing and general support fires were furnished by all types of Arty, to include amphibian tanks, AA Gun Btries, and organic reinforcing Corps Arty. All Arty was tied into the 7th Div Arty Survey.

Methods of placing fire on the target included the use of Air Observation from L-4 Arty Ln Planes, FOs with the Inf, terrestrial OPs, survey data, and map data. Standard Operating Procedure as set forth in current Field Manuals was used in the Bn FDCs.

Due to the quality of the maps provided, map data for area targets were very satisfactory. The coordination of all survey within the XXIV Corps provided excellent results when using the fires of XXIV Corps Arty and adjacent Div Arty on targets within the 7th Inf Div sector. This included both map data and targets located by adjustments of one (1) unit.

Night protective fires were provided by adjusting all available Arty on normal and emergency barrages after the Inf had consolidated its positions for the night. Protective fires were provided whenever the Inf stopped to consolidate their positions upon reaching an objective.

Night harassing fires were placed on known and suspected enemy installations and on enemy lines of communication. The amount of ammunition for harassing fires varied in proportion to the available ammunition supply and activity noted during the day.

Due to the extensive enemy underground fortifications and the negligible movement by the enemy during daylight, very few profitable targets were located for the massing of fires by more than that of two (2) or three (3) Bns.

The amphibian tanks and AA Gun Btries were used extensively on neutralization, harassing, and protective fire missions. A limited number of observed fire missions were fired by these units. The FDC procedure of these units was identical to that of the Field Artillery and the application of it by these units were excellent.

As in all previous operations, experience has indicated that the employment of Arty fire should be flexible and should be adapted to fit the tactics used by the enemy. In this operation, the enemy was committed to a defensive role in which he did not hesitate to launch an immediate counterattack to regain critical terrain just after it had been captured by friendly troops. In a number of cases, the counterattacking Japs advanced through their own mortar barrage in order to close with our troops. They had planned and constructed a series of well organized, strongly defended fortifications of all types which were mutually supported by fire power from adjacent strong points. They had burrowed into the reverse slopes of the innumerable steep knifelike ridges where they were able to remain in relative safety during the heaviest bombardment. When Arty fire was lifted, the Japs had covered routes of approach to defensive positions on the forward slopes from which they defended to the last man. A normal type linear preparation fired in front of the attacking Inf was wasteful of ammunition, largely ineffective, and merely served to warn the enemy that an attack would follow as soon as the fire was lifted. Likewise, preparations which consisted of concentrations of massed fires over a prolonged period of time on the same area were wasteful of ammunition and did not prevent the enemy from being able to stop the attacker from well concealed emplacements which were not neutralized. It was preferable to fire a sudden concentration of fire at odd intervals of time on the enemy so that he had no way of telling if the Arty had lifted and the Inf had begun to advance.

After an educational program conducted by the 7th Div Arty Cmdr with the Regtl Cmdrs and Arty Bn Cmdrs, the principle was finally put across that the Arty plan of fire should be made to fit the plan of attack of the Inf. The Inf was responsible for neutralizing and destroying the enemy from the front line positions to a distance of three hundred (300) or four hundred (400) yards. The FO of the direct support Arty took care of targets from three hundred (300) yards forward of the front lines to about eight hundred (800) yards. The medium Arty, under Div Arty control, took care of targets from eight hundred (800) yards forward of the front lines to the Corps XX line. Only Arty fire adjusted by the direct support observers could be used against targets closer than eight hundred (800) yards from the front lines. However, all the Arty was allowed to fire on targets beyond eight hundred (800) yards as well as beyond the Corps XX line. Corps Arty could not fire short of the XX line without obtaining clearance from the Div Arty. The direct support Arty maintained Bn OPs from which the entire Inf sector could be observed and any targets which appeared could be destroyed or neutralized. Every effort utilizing all intelligence agencies was made to locate enemy strong points, paying particular attention to reverse slopes suitable for mortar positions and enemy caves containing machine guns, anti-tank guns, and Arty pieces. The Inf Cmdr, with his direct support Arty Cmdr, made a careful study of the terrain to be taken and formulated the Arty plan for the support of the attack. All requests for additional Arty fire were made to Div Arty which secured additional Arty if needed and coordinated the Arty plan of fire over the entire Div front. The Arty registered on check points in its sector so that accurate map transfers could be made on critical terrain features. On the night prior to the attack, all critical targets were fired on throughout the night. This night harassing fire close to the front lines was actually a preparation fire for the attack next day. This firing was intensified in the morning prior to the assault so that continuous neutralization fire, varying from one (1) gun to a Bn, depending on the size and importance of the target, was maintained. On the approach of the Inf to the objective, the FO with the assault Cos lifted the fire, being sure that he had Arty adjusted to protect the objective to be taken against an enemy counterattack. Arty fire from excellent OPs was conducted against reverse slope mortar positions. Observers at the Bn OP paid particular attention to locating enemy mortars firing on our troops.

Against particularly strong positions, the Arty preparation lasted several days and consisted of precision fire for destruction, using one (1) or two (2) guns ordinarily, against all located enemy emplacements. Enemy caves and emplacements on the forward slopes of ridges were systematically and methodically destroyed and filled in. In many cases, this firing uncovered concrete emplacements which had been carefully camouflaged so as to be invisible. The 155mm gun, firing at a range of 1000 yards, was particularly effective for this type of firing. After the destruction of fortifications on the forward slopes, Arty, using high angle fire, was adjusted on all reverse slopes where targets had been located from a study of air photos. It was only after the fortified enemy area was thoroughly blasted by Arty that the Inf was able to advance. In many cases, our troops would be able to seize the top of a small hill only to be driven off by accurate mortar fire. In that case, the Arty adjusted a box barrage around the hill and the Inf moved in to retake the hill and dig in. Even though driven from the top of a hill, the enemy defended the reverse slopes to the death.

The concrete piercing fuze (T-105) was used by this Div Arty for the first time and found to be extremely effective in reducing enemy installations built in coral rock formations.

The lack of daylight movement of enemy troops and the underground defensive system adopted by the enemy provided relatively few targets suitable for time fire. Time fire was used effectively as a cover over attacking tanks and for night harassing missions.

The VT fuze for the 105mm Howitzer was used on one (1) occasion by each Bn of this Div Arty, but in all cases the extremely high percentage of premature bursts caused friendly casualties and lowered the morale of the ground troops to such an extent that it was not used again by this Div Arty during this operation. The VT fuzes on hand were inspected by Ord personnel from higher Hq and a great majority of the fuzes were found to be defective.

Both WP and base ejection HC smoke were used. WP was very effective in driving the enemy from the more shallow underground installations. The base ejection HC Smoke proved to be the better as a screening agent as it required a less number of rounds to establish and maintain a satisfactory screen. The loss of observation due to the excessive use of smoke across a narrow front became so great that orders were issued by Div Arty prohibiting the use of smoke except when permitted by Div Arty.

USE OF CORPS ARTILLERY BY THE DIVISION ARTILLERY

XXIV Corps Arty was used extensively by the 7th Div Arty on counterbattery and night harassing missions. The many caves and underground installations employed by the enemy provided numerous profitable targets for the heavy Arty. To effectively reduce these installations required precision adjustments by Div Arty Observers. Initially much difficulty was encountered due to the long line of communications between the observer and the Corps Arty unit providing fire. This difficulty was overcome by providing the XXIV Corps Arty Bns with an SCR 608 preset with the frequencies of the Bns of the 7th Div Arty. No radio is authorized for this purpose. Due to the large number of Arty Bns in the combined Div Artys of the XXIV Corps, it was impossible for any one Corps Arty Bn to guard them all. This was solved upon request and approval of the use of a heavy Arty unit by notifying the Group Hq, either by wire or over the XXIV Corps Arty Fire Direction Radio (SCR 193). This Group Hq, in turn, notified the Bn concerned and this Bn would come up on the proper radio frequency and contact the observer or Bn FDC conducting the adjustment, thus providing direct and rapid communication.

On two (2) occasions, by request of 7th Div Arty and approval of XXIV Corps Arty, single 155mm Guns were emplaced in front line positions and conducted direct fire on particular, heavy enemy fortifications. In one instance a 155mm Howitzer of the 7th Div Arty was used on this type of mission. Both weapons effectively accomplished their missions.

When medium XXIV Corps Arty Bns were assigned to reinforce the 7th Div Arty, the Corps Arty Bn concerned aligned on its organic radios, the Air Spot and control frequencies of the 7th Div Arty. If one Regtl sector required a heavy usage of medium Arty, the medium Corps Arty Bn also aligned the frequency of the light Bn providing direct support in that sector, thus providing direct communication with the observers in that sector.

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

Personnel and equipment for control and direction of Naval Gunfire were furnished by the 75th JASCO, with the exception of the Div Naval Gunfire Officer who was furnished by the 7th Div Arty. A Shore Fire Control Party, consisting of an officer and eight (8) enlisted men, with necessary communications equipment came ashore with each Inf Bn. A Naval Ln team, consisting of an officer and five (5) enlisted men, with necessary communications equipment, came ashore with each Inf Regt. The Div Naval Team, consisting of an officer and six (6) enlisted men came ashore and operated with 7th Div Arty Hq. Naval Gunfire was placed under the direction of the CG, 7th Div Arty. Bn teams were furnished with one (1) SCR 694 hand carried radio, and one (1) vehicular mounted SCR 284 radio. Regtl teams were equipped with two (2) SCR 284 radios, one (1) hand carried and one (1) vehicular mounted. The Div Naval Team operated with one (1) vehicular mounted SCR 193, and three (3) SCR 284 radios. Communications were adequate and

functioned excellently throughout the operation.

Naval Gunfire was not used extensively for the first several days of the operation. Troops advanced rapidly across the island, encountered little resistance, and required little support except night illumination. After the island was crossed and the advance started south, conditions were very favorable for the use of Naval Gunfire. Navigational conditions were such that ships could come in quite close to shore, and follow troops southward, using a great amount of direct fire in close support of troops. During much of the time as the lines moved southward, a very satisfactory line of fire was possible, often parallel to front lines, making it unnecessary to fire over friendly troops. Naval Gunfire was widely used, until the troops reached the southern beaches. On normal days, the 7th Inf Div was supported by five (5) or six (6) firing ships, each with its own Spotting Plane. Ordinarily, three (3) light ships (Destroyers), with Air Spot, were assigned to the Bns for close supporting fire. Air Spot controlled firing in areas where ground observation was not possible. This Spotter Plane furnished valuable reconnaissance information to Shore Fire Control Parties, who passed it on to Bn Cmdrs. Each Regt was supported by a heavy ship (Battleship, Cruiser) with Air Spot. One (1) Battleship or heavy Cruiser, with Air Spot, was operated from 7th Div Arty Hq on deep supporting missions, targets of opportunity, targets submitted by Intelligence Section, and by other Air Observers. When targets were assigned to the Div Naval Officer for action, and close-in targets were assigned to Bn teams, deep supporting missions were handled by Regts or by the ship controlled by the Div Naval Team. Naval Gunfire and Arty were coordinated at 7th Div Arty Hq. On a number of occasions Arty marked with Smoke areas they wished covered by Naval Gunfire. Targets located by Naval Air Spot which could not be reached by Support Ships were turned over to Field Artillery. On several occasions Naval Spotter Planes adjusted Arty and mortar fire on targets which they had located, but could not hit from the seaward side. Arty passed on to Naval Gunfire targets noted by their planes which were on reverse slopes from shore based Arty.

Greater use was made of Naval Gunfire during this operation than on any operation in which this Div Arty has participated.

Because of the large caliber and high velocity of Naval guns, they were used primarily against caves, fortifications, and enemy Arty. The accuracy of Naval Gunfire on pin-point targets was excellent.

Naval Gunfire was used by Inf Cmdrs to cover reverse slopes of hills toward which their troops were advancing.

Naval Gunfire was used extensively on night harassing missions.

Naval Star Shell illumination was provided on the front lines every night from 1 April to 19 June 1945. Star shell illumination was used excessively during the first six (6) weeks of the operation. During the latter phases, Inf Cmdrs were urged to keep routine illumination to a maximum of six (6) to eight (8) stars per hour, fired at irregular intervals. Shore Fire Control Parties were in constant communication with their illuminating ships, and in the event of a counterattack, or attempt at counterlanding, the rate of illumination was instantly increased to the desired point for the period of the emergency. Star shell illumination was provided along the eastern coastal area at staggered intervals throughout each night in order to prevent movement of troops in small craft, and keep down operation of suicide boats.

The LCI (R), LCI (M), and LSM (R) received their most extensive use to date on this operation. During the latter stages from six (6) to twelve (12) of these small craft were stationed at intervals from front lines to the southern tip of the island, firing on all observed targets of opportunity, and denying use of coastal roads to the enemy. Craft of this type were particularly useful because

of their ability to go in very close to the beach. The possibility of using these craft on navigable rivers on a large land mass may be considered. On the last few days of this operation two (2) LCI (R)s were equipped with loudspeakers, a Japanese interpreter placed aboard, and the craft sent along the southern coast of the island, urging the Japanese hiding in caves in this area to surrender.

The excellent performance and enthusiastic cooperation of all the firing ships during this operation were most commendable and were much appreciated by all Shore Fire Control units. Ships were made available promptly on request of Div Naval Officers, and relief ships were quickly provided when an assigned fire support ship started getting low on ammunition. Routine Navy administration matters were kept off the Command net which at no time became completely bogged down as it has on some previous operations.

The present Shore Fire Control doctrine is workable and flexible.

One of the outstanding features of this operation has been the close co-operation, and resulting effective coordination, of land, sea, and air activities.

Ammunition expended in support of 7th Inf Div from time Shore Fire Control Parties took control on LOVE Day until Naval Gunfire ceased on 19 June 1945:

16"	-	691
14"	-	1,488
12"	-	1,438
8"	-	6,040
6"	-	3,706
5"	-	85,365
5" Rockets	-	18,762
4.2" Mortars	-	3,844
Star Shells	-	14,000
40mm	-	61,568
20mm	-	60,843

COMMUNICATION

a. Wire.

Wire continued to be the primary means of communication, with the exception of the landing phase and communication with FOs. Wire communication was established immediately upon landing and was maintained throughout the operation.

The only difficulties encountered in laying and maintaining wire communication was the destruction of lines by tracked vehicles and weather. The destruction of wire by tracked vehicles was minimized by laying a maximum of wire overhead. The training of drivers of all echelons in the preservation of wire cannot be over stressed. Loss of efficiency due to dampness of the weather was negligible, but during periods of heavy rainfall, vehicles for wire laying were useless because of road conditions. During these periods it was necessary to lay all wire by hand. Though this slowed down the establishment and maintenance of wire lines and over burdened all wire crews, at no time did the wire communications break down.

When distances between the 7th Div Arty Hq and the Arty Bns became excessive, forward switching centrals were established, thus decreasing the amount of wire to be laid.

Both Simplex and Phantom circuits were employed on lines that carried heavy traffic, with good success.

The BD 96 was used by this Div Arty for the first time, and the efficiency obtained was much greater than that when one (1) or more BD 72's were used.

The TS-27/TSM was used successfully and aided materially in locating breaks in wire lines.

W-110 B wire was used throughout and did function efficiently and stood up under adverse conditions. W-130 A wire is not deemed satisfactory for use by Arty units.

Approximately one hundred seventy five (175) miles of wire was laid by the 7th Div Arty Hq Btry Wire Section during this operation.

b. Radio.

Radio communication was used entirely in the initial landing phase and as a supplement to communications throughout the entire operation.

Radio equipment and vehicles were given a high priority in unloading, and all essential radios were deck loaded. Radio communication was established while afloat prior to the landing of any assault elements. Radio communication was maintained continuously throughout the landing phase between Div Hq and Div Arty Hq and between Div Arty Hq and all Arty Bns utilizing the SCR 500 and SCR 600 series radios respectively.

All radios used by the 7th Div Arty Hq, after the landing was complete, were vehicular mounted which provided more efficient operation than when using the 12 volt, wet cell battery.

The 7th Div Arty Hq maintained radios in the following nets:

- (1) Corps Fire Direction Net (SCR 193).
- (2) Div Command Net (SCR 508).

As well as providing direct communication with Div, this radio was used extensively as a relay station between Div and Inf Regts.

- (3) Div Arty Command Net (SCR 193), later redesignated as the S-2 net.

All Arty Bns and the 7th Div Arty Air Officer maintained radios in this net. All intelligence and routine messages were transmitted over this net and all messages were received by all stations in the net.

- (4) Div Arty Control Net (SCR 608).

This net was used as a fire control net.

- (5) The 7th Div Arty Hq maintained a listening watch on the Div Arty Air Spot Net but the net was controlled by the 7th Div Arty Air Officer at the Air Strip.

- (6) During the early stages of the operation, the 7th Div Arty operated an SCR 193 in the Div Air Observer Net (High Performance Planes). In the later stages, this radio was placed with the medium Arty Bn to provide direct communication when fire support was required. This was a non-organic radio and both radio and personnel were furnished by the 75th JASCO.

Radio communication with the 776th Amph Tk Bn and AA Gun Btries was had by providing these units with Arty radios.

For the 600 series radios the 7th Div Arty Hq was allotted two (2) frequencies and each Arty Bn was allotted two (2) frequencies. In all previous operations, the 7th Div Arty as a whole operated with a total of approximately twenty three (23) frequencies. The allocation of two (2) frequencies per unit was inadequate. A minimum of three (3) frequencies per Bn is required in order to insure efficient communications.

c. General.

The present wire and wire equipment is adequate and satisfactory.

The present radio and radio equipment is adequate and satisfactory with the exception of the SCR 609 issued to FOs. The weight of this radio is excessive and not suitable for use by FOs under the conditions experienced by this Div Arty.

No telegraph sets were used by this Div Arty during this operation.

No difficulty was experienced in obtaining Signal resupply or replacement.

The terminals of some Australian Batteries were marked in error and resulted in blowing out tubes in some sets.

A great amount of interference was experienced from Navy and Marine operated radios.

No radio nets were jammed by enemy stations.

No security violations were reported.

LIAISON

a. With organic units:

Three (3) Arty Ln Parties were provided each Inf Regt. These parties were employed as follows:

One (1) Ln Party was with each assault Inf Bn.

The third Ln Party (less the LnO) remained with the Inf Bn in reserve. The LnO went to the Regtl CP where one (1) NCO and a radio team were stationed permanently. On commitment of the reserve Inf Bn, the LnO left the Regtl CP and joined his party with the Inf Bn. The LnO with the Inf Bn going into reserve left that Bn to provide Ln at the Regtl CP. This provided relief from front line duty of Ln Parties. When all three (3) Bns of the Inf Regt were committed, the NCO at the Regtl CP provided Ln.

Close command Ln was maintained between the Inf Regtl Cmdr and the Bn Cmdr of the direct support Arty Bn.

In the initial phases of the operation the Ln personnel was from the direct support Bn, which normally had provided direct support for a particular Regt, but as the operation progressed, the direct support Arty Bn, Ln and FO Parties were interchanged in order to provide relief.

No communication difficulties were encountered by utilizing this flexible system nor was there any noticeable decrease in the efficiency of the delivery of fire when the observers of one (1) Arty Bn were using an Arty Bn other than their own.

Due to the high officer casualty rate, many NCOs were operating in the capacity of FOs, LnOs, or Asst Btry Executives, in the later stages of the operation. No decrease in the efficiency of the various units was noted due to this utilization of NCOs in officer capacities.

No LnO from the medium Arty Bn was employed by 7th Div Arty.

When two (2) or more Arty Bns were operating as a group, Ln was established with the Bn of the Group Cmdr.

b. With adjacent and reinforcing units:

Prior to the operation, LnOs were exchanged with the Arty Hqs of adjacent Divs. Each of these LnOs was provided with a radio and operators for direct communication with his parent unit. This proved to be much more satisfactory than relying on the already crowded channels of communication of higher echelons.

Ln was provided to this Hq by XXIV Corps Arty and all reinforcing units.

At times, the number of LnOs became so great that there was insufficient room in the CP to accommodate them. A separate Ln Section was set up adjacent to the CP, and all LnOs were put under the control of the XXIV Corps Arty LnO. The Corps Arty LnO was provided with all pertinent information and was charged with disseminating that information to the other LnOs.

OBSERVATION

During the initial days of the operation, observation was confined to FOs and Ln Planes. The rapidity of maneuver and the terrain did not permit the establishment of permanent terrestrial OPs.

Two (2) FO Parties were assigned by each direct support FA Bn to each Inf Bn. These observers, plus the LnO working with the Inf Bn Cmdr, provided adequate observation for the close support of the Inf.

As the situation stabilized along the east coast, the establishment of permanent shell proof OPs was undertaken by each Bn. The first OPs had limited zones of observation but as more favorable terrain was taken, it was possible to observe the entire Div front. These OPs were invaluable in accomplishing the deep support of the Inf and permitted Inf and Arty Cmdrs to plan the attack while actually observing the terrain.

It was necessary to construct OPs which would withstand enemy shelling. Without exception, the enemy shelled the high ground available for OPs.

The Ln Planes provided excellent observation during the operation. Their observation was limited less by unfavorable weather than by the promiscuous use of smoke in the target area. It was necessary for planes to fly in the trajectory of Arty, Mortar, and Naval Gunfire to observe the target area. Also, the enemy AA fire was a constant hazard. Planes were given search missions as information was obtained from the Target Information Center, and suitable targets were attacked. Continuous observation was provided from dawn to darkness to insure the attack of targets of opportunity as quickly as they arose.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

Information was disseminated to each Bn over a radio net specifically established for that purpose. Each Bn and the 7th Div Arty Air Officer received for all messages sent over the net so all were informed immediately and a great number of radio transmissions or telephone calls were eliminated. This net was operated on an SCR 193 so there was no difficulty with transmission. Radio security was rigidly observed without a delay in receipt of messages.

All information received, including reports of fire missions and flight reports of Cub Observers, were telephoned to Div as soon as it was received.

SURVEY

A representative of the 287th FA Obsn Bn accompanied the 7th Div Arty Survey Officer ashore in the initial landing and established a common point and direction. The XXIV Corps Arty carried survey to the 96th Inf Div and to the adjacent Corps. The 7th Div Arty Survey Officer provided each Bn with a place mark initially, and during all displacements started extending survey to the new position prior to the movement of Bns. A base was established on the KADENA Air Field and the survey was carried forward by triangulation rather than by traverse. This triangulation was carried forward to the vicinity of KISHABA (8782) on the basis of the distance measured on the KADENA Air Field. The azimuth was checked periodically by taking sun shorts and the maximum error found was one (1) minute. Survey Control was taken anew from XXIV Corps Arty at a point in 8980, and was carried down the east coast to new positions of our Bns. The 7th Div Arty Survey Section established short bases in the vicinity of Pinnacle Hill (8577) and Tomb Hill (8475) and surveyed critical points in the target area. A base was established between Hill 178 (8375) and Check Point 51 (8275) near TANABARU, further critical points were surveyed and orientation was given to the Bns at their OPs. An enemy triangulation station was surveyed from the base of Pinnacle Hill (8577) and also from the survey which was being carried down the beach. The discrepancy between the two (2) results amounted to fifteen (15) yards. When the front lines moved down to Conical Hill (8271) a traverse was run down the road from OUKI to the vicinity of YONABARU. In order to make our survey conform to the map, the azimuth was changed one (1) degree and a small correction was made in the coordinates. It became apparent on starting the survey south of YONABARU that it would be possible to revert to the original azimuth. The coordinates used by the 7th Div Arty agreed with the map, but differed from the XXIV Corps Arty Survey by approximately one hundred (100) yards. The discrepancy noted in the map occurred where two (2) of the map sheets joined together in the neighborhood of OUKI. The survey from YONABARU to the final Bn positions on the south shore of the island was carried by triangulation methods.

TARGET INFORMATION CENTER

The Target Information Center was operated under the direction of the S-2 by the Intelligence Sergeant. Additional personnel was not provided for this section.

The index developed by the 7th Div Arty Target Information Center was a mimeographed sheet set up as a form having the following columns: Description, Location, Source of Information, Classification, Priority, Action Recommended, Action Taken, and Remarks. These sheets were indexed to a particular one thousand (1000) yard target square so that all targets within the square would appear on one (1) sheet or two (2) sheets if there were a large number of targets. This index proved the most workable, although a cross index by the type

of target was also maintained. As target areas were approached, all of the targets could be screened and plotted and assigned to the appropriate agency for action.

Primary sources of information were those normal to the Divisional Arty, such as Terrestrial OPs, Ln Planes, FOs, plus reports from Naval Gunfire, Ground and Air Observers, and High Performance Air Observers.

Additional sources were the 7th Inf Div, XXIV Corps, XXIV Corps Arty, and Tenth Army Intelligence Reports, which included Photo Interpretation and Prisoner of War Interrogations. Targets requiring immediate attention were received by wire from 7th Inf Div G-2 and XXIV Corps Arty prior to their written reports.

The 7th Div Arty did not operate a Photo Interpretation Team, but received the reports from the teams with 7th Inf Div and XXIV Corps Arty. These reports were distributed down to Bns and the 7th Div Arty Air Section.

Targets located by the Target Information Center were given to Ground Observers, Air Observers, and Naval Gunfire as appropriate for search and action. Only selected targets were attacked without actual confirmation and adjustment by air observation.

Some difficulty resulted from the great number of caves and tombs, all of which possibly contained military installations. Only in the main enemy defense line was it expedient to attack every cave and tomb. In all other phases it was necessary to select the targets for attack to those actually suspected as military objectives.

COUNTERBATTERY

As a result of observed fire, sixty one (61) Arty pieces were destroyed and two hundred seventeen (217) Arty positions were neutralized by the 7th Div Arty. These do not include adjustments of XXIV Corps Arty units made by 7th Div Arty Observers or guns destroyed by Naval Gunfire working with the 7th Inf Div.

During darkness Flash Bases were operated by each Bn with gratifying results. Each Bn computed every triangulation and reported their solution to Div Arty together with a report as to the accuracy of the plot and activity of the gun. If the plot was reasonably accurate or close to a known or suspected gun position it was fired by the medium Bn or by XXIV Corps Arty. The preferred method of fire was a two (2) Bn TOT. Each Bn reported all azimuth readings and "flash bang" information to Div Arty where it was checked against the information from other CPs and known active positions for decision as to whether or not it would be fired.

All of the above information was forwarded to XXIV Corps Arty as rapidly as it was received to permit a coordination of information across the XXIV Corps front.

After the enemy shelling had been greatly reduced, the only Flash Base for the 7th Div Arty was operated by the medium Bn.

As a result of information received from OPs within the 7th Inf Div sector, eighty one (81) night neutralizations were fired. OPs reported that these fires immediately silenced the enemy Arty in seventy percent (70%) of the missions fired.

Each day a list of the plots obtained throughout the night was distributed to the Ln Planes of the 7th Div Arty, XXIV Corps Arty, and Naval Gunfire Air Observers for search. This resulted in the location of numerous areas of activity and caves capable of sheltering Arty.

MAPS AND PHOTOS

Maps received prior to the operation were adequate and in sufficient quantity, and proved to be sufficiently accurate for use by the Field Artillery. This accuracy aided in the rapid location of targets and the ability to fire deep, unobserved harassing fire. Later revisions issued during the operation were improvements over the earlier maps in that they had improved vertical control and greater detail.

Photos issued prior to the operation were good but were not issued for distribution down to Bns. Vertical coverage with stereo pairs for distribution down to FA Bns would be advisable to permit the study of reverse slopes for potential targets.

Photo coverage during the early phases of the operation was reduced to a minimum. During this period photos were taken and printed by the 7th Div Arty Air Section and supplied to the Inf Cmdrs as well as to the Arty. The use of the organic planes for photo work was limited to relatively small areas because of the equipment available.

OPERATION OF THE LIAISON PLANES

All planes of 7th Div Arty were centrally located and controlled. Planes operated on a regular schedule which put one plane over the target area continually during the daylight hours. Each plane was equipped with a SCR 609 radio which had a common Air Spot Channel, and one Bn channel as an alternate. The radio setup enabled any Bn to use the plane in the air, if needed, and functioned very satisfactorily. By regularly scheduled flights a maximum of "useable" air observation with a minimum number of flights was had. Fourteen (14) flights daily of approximately one and one half ($1\frac{1}{2}$) hours duration each, were sufficient to provide continual observation from dawn to dusk. Each Pilot flew approximately two (2) missions a day for approximately three (3) hours total daily flight time. As a result, Pilot and Observer efficiency was high. All Pilots and Observers were familiar with the entire sector and were able to conduct fire missions anywhere in the 7th Inf Div zone of action.

During the initial phases of the operation, weather conditions for aerial observation were very favorable. For the month of April a total of three hundred (300) combat missions were flown using seven (7) L-4 planes for a total of over four hundred (400) hours. Eight (8) Pilots did most of the flying. Over eight hundred fifty (850) combat missions were flown during the period 1 April through 20 June 1945, totaling over 1200 hours. No combat missions were flown after 20 June 1945.

Regular schedules enabled maintenance personnel to give maximum maintenance care to the planes with the result that no serious equipment failure was encountered.

Good landing strips cut operational losses. Only one (1) plane was damaged beyond repair during the operation. It was found necessary to construct landing fields 1000 feet in length and sixty (60) feet in width for efficient L-5 and L-4 joint operation. By surfacing for all weather operation, several days of aerial observation that otherwise would have been lost due to strip conditions after heavy rain, were obtained.

Ten (10) photo missions were flown. Twenty four (24) hour delivery of processed film and prints to front line units was accomplished. In one (1) instance, photos taken at 1330 were dropped at Div GP at 1830 same day. All photo missions were of front line areas. Both obliques and verticals were taken.

A K-21 camera was used in most of the missions. It was found superior to the K-20 for our purposes.

Twenty five (25) supply drops (food and medical supplies) were made during periods when roads were washed out. Mail and courier service was also handled during the same period, and liaison maintained between forward and rear echelons.

An SCR 608, jeep mounted, for ground station, equipped with Air Spot Channel and "B" Channels of all Bns, worked very successfully. Communication was maintained with planes continually. Missions were assigned to planes in air with a minimum of transmission time.

The Photo Laboratory was sufficiently equipped, but could be made more portable and could be put into operation at a new location more rapidly if it were mounted in a $1\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck.

The combined personnel of the air sections established a mess at the Air Strip. The T/O provides no mess personnel for these sections, consequently it was necessary to obtain two (2) mess personnel from other sections.

SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

AIR CORPS SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

The present number of Ln Planes and Pilots authorized a FA Bn is satisfactory. The 7th Div Arty Hq and Hq Btry should be authorized two (2) additional Pilots and two (2) L-5 Ln Planes, making a total of four (4) L-5 Ln Planes. It is essential to fly many reconnaissance missions for the Inf, courier missions to higher Hq, make supply, medical, and photo drops, and fly photo missions. To prevent interferences with scheduled fire missions, the addition of two (2) L-5 Ln Planes is considered necessary.

Transporting the Arty Ln Planes in an LST has proved to be the most suitable method. The planes are partially disassembled. The fuselage, uncrated, is loaded into a $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton LWB truck. The wings are placed in a light crate and are also carried in a $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton LWB truck. With the ramp type LST, the $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck can be driven off the weather deck of the LST just as soon as the LST beaches. The use of the "Brodie" LST has proven unsatisfactory.

CHEMICAL WARFARE EQUIPMENT

All impregnated clothing was carried by the 7th Inf Div Chemical Officer instead of by the organization. This relieved the fighting troops of the burden of maintaining and hauling these bulky supplies.

Gas masks were carried ashore by each individual. Several days after the initial landing, the gas masks were collected by each organization when it became evident that gas would not be used. The gas masks were then readily available in case of need.

ENGINEER EQUIPMENT

Throughout the operation on OKINAWA, the D-7 Tractor with bulldozer has proved indispensable. The dozers were used as prime movers, to dig in the Howitzers, build up ammunition revetments, construct access roads to Btry positions, construct landing strips for Ln Planes. In some cases it would have been impossible to occupy Btry positions and supply ammunition without the dozer.

It is believed that each Bn should be equipped with four angle dozers. Three (3) of the tractors should be equipped with a front power takeoff and one (1) tractor should be equipped with an Hyster High Speed Winch and an "A" Frame strong enough to handle the D-7 Tractor and M-5 High Speed Tractor.

Camouflage nets which can be easily carried on the trails of the Howitzers were used in concealing Howitzer positions when the fighting became stabilized. However, no other camouflage equipment was used and, due to the great bulk of this equipment and the limited transportation available, camouflage nets and equipment not needed should be loaded and transported by the Engrs to be drawn as needed in the latter phases of an operation.

Each Bn should have 5000 sand bags available for reveting vital installations.

The Engrs should carry an adequate supply of barbed wire concertinas which can be drawn as needed after the initial issue of fifty (50) concertinas per Bn is expended.

The Engrs should design, construct, and issue a lighter, stronger, pre-fabricated type of kitchen frame for a pyramidal tent and latrine box. These should be made of plywood and adequately reinforced at the sides and corners with metal.

Each Bn should be issued a refrigerator for the storage of perishable foods and medical supplies requiring refrigeration.

Each Bn needs a larger, automatic, gasoline driven electric generator for lighting up CPs and communications centers.

ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

The list of vehicles brought by the 7th Div Arty is listed in Section V, Loading. The vehicles taken in assault shipping were adequate for operating on a large land mass such as found on the Island of OKINAWA. Sufficient vehicles were taken to enable the Field Artillery to be able to displace its Bns and keep itself supplied with ammunition. The transportation landed in assault shipping was less than that prescribed by War Department T/O's and T/E's and was not sufficient to transport all the Arty simultaneously. However, due to the shortage of personnel, it would have placed a great burden on the Arty to furnish drivers for vehicles not absolutely essential and to maintain them in operating condition when the personnel available to the Arty was barely sufficient to perform its mission of furnishing Arty support to the Inf.

The Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes issued to the Field Artillery were not too essential. However, they were used and undoubtedly prevented a lot of needless firing at noises during the night. The issue of an adequate number of flares during the latter part of the operation accomplished the same result.

Due to restrictions imposed by higher Hqs forbidding the firing of ground weapons at enemy airplanes by all troops except AA units unless directly attacked by enemy planes, there was no occasion to use the .50 caliber machine gun against enemy planes. For this operation fifty percent (50%) of the .50 caliber machine guns were replaced by .30 caliber machine guns.

Ten (10) caliber .30, M-1 rifles were issued each Bn in lieu of the caliber .30 carbine for the use of wiremen and FO Parties. This number was adequate. Five (5) caliber .45 sub-machine guns, M-3, were issued each Btry primarily for close defense of the Btry positions. These were entirely satisfactory.

The rocket launcher (Bazooka) issued the Arty was never used during this operation and is not needed by the Arty.

The Range Finder was not used throughout the operation and is definitely not needed. Ranges can be computed quickly and more accurately by the use of short base survey methods.

The 7th Div Arty is still equipped with the old type BC Scopes which have been in the Bns for over four (4) years and which cannot be placed in serviceable condition by the Ord. They should all be replaced by the new type BC Scope, M-65.

Extra night lights for aiming stakes were needed during this operation.

The High Speed Tractor, M-5, has proved to be the most mobile vehicle in all types of terrain encountered. It should have a stronger winch. Considerable difficulty was experienced with the clutch which should be stronger and more durable. A wider track would definitely improve mobility in soft mud. One (1) M-5 Tractor pulling two (2) M-10 Trailers was able to haul two hundred forty two (242) rounds of 105mm ammunition over the worst kind of roads as compared to one hundred (100) rounds which a $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6 x 6 truck can haul over good roads.

Cargo Carrier, M-29-C, has proved to be an invaluable vehicle in rice paddies and marshy terrain where it can be used as a wire laying vehicle. It is an excellent vehicle for mounting the SCR 608 and SCR 193 radios. The tracks have a tendency to slip off and transmission failures are high. It cannot be used to tow heavy loads and should not be used to tow any load. It will not operate over roads deep in thick mud which has mixed with it small rock.

Greater attention should be paid by Ord supply agencies to the segregation of Arty ammunition by lot number. This is particularly necessary for the direct support Bns which fire in close support of the Inf. The Arty received as many as twenty (20) lot numbers in one (1) twenty four (24) hour period.

VT Fuze for 105mm ammunition was unsatisfactory. No VT Fuze for the 155mm Howitzer was fired. This type fuze must be improved to prevent a high percentage of premature bursts above the heads of the Inf. No amount of high pressure selling as to the effectiveness of this fuze will convince the Inf of its superiority over other types of fuzes if air bursts occur with any frequency over their heads.

The HE-AT ammunition could not be used effectively on this operation.

Metal containers for powder and ammunition were more than satisfactory. They were easily handled by one (1) man, protected contents from damage in handling, and prevented the ammunition in one pile from being destroyed when hit by enemy Arty. In one (1) case, an enemy 150mm shell hit a dump of one hundred (100) rounds of WP, which destroyed three (3) rounds. A similar dump of wooden crated ammunition was totally destroyed.

During this operation, the Ord replaced sixteen (16) 105mm Howitzer tubes and twelve (12) complete Howitzers. The three (3) light Bns of the 7th Div Arty fired a total of 218,000 rounds in eighty two (82) days. It was determined that between 8,000 and 10,000 rounds, not service rounds, could be fired before the lands in the tube became stripped and the tube had to be replaced.

Mud skids on the 155mm Howitzers proved to be invaluable during this operation. Without mud skids it would have been impossible to move the Howitzers through the heavy mud encountered.

QUARTERMASTER SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

It has been found that the poncho is not suitable for Arty cannoneers. The raincoat would be preferable.

Each Btry in the Arty should be issued a two hundred fifty (250) gallon water trailer in addition to the present allowance of five (5) gallon water cans. The water trailer would save time and wear and tear on vehicles.

Each firing Btry should be issued a light-proof tent to enable the Btry Executive to compute data and keep necessary records of firing.

An additional non-portable typewriter with an eighteen inch (18") carriage is needed by each Bn.

An extra burner per Btry for the Field Range, M-1937, is needed to heat water and as a spare.

In a country with a climate such as that experienced on OKINAWA in the spring, each individual should be issued two (2) wool blankets, two (2) wool shirts, one (1) field jacket. For this operation, the men were allowed to bring one (1) wool blanket, no wool shirts, and no field jackets, with the result that many men acquired colds and suffered discomfort and hardships from the damp cold.

Each individual should be allowed a duffel bag in which he can keep items of personal comfort. In the present operation, six (6) men were allowed one (1) duffel bag so that with the loss of one (1) duffel bag six (6) men are absolutely destitute of all clothing except for what they were wearing.

SIGNAL CORPS EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

The SCR 619 radio should be substituted for the SCR 609, especially for all FO Parties. The SCR 609 radio was not designed to be carried in the field. It is too heavy, bulky, and cannot stand up under the abuse to which a radio of necessity is submitted.

The SCR 284 should be replaced by the SCR 694 for the same reason.

The amount of wire carried by the 7th Div Arty in assault shipping was adequate for the initial phase of the operation. However, additional wire should be carried by Signal Supply. W-130 wire has proved unsatisfactory and should be replaced by W-110.

Booster coils are needed by each Bn on long wire lines.

The waterproof bag used inside a duffel bag has proven to be more satisfactory than the regular issue waterproof bag for protecting radios. The regular issue waterproof bag is too heavy and bulky for FO Sections to carry.

One (1) Bn fitted out a 1-ton trailer as a radio repair shop which proved to be satisfactory as it provided a convenient storage space and workshop for repairing and aligning radios.

Many of the BA-39 and BA-40 radio batteries were of Australian manufacture which were wired improperly and burned out some radios.

Two (2) radio frequencies for the 600 series radio were assigned each Bn for this operation. The number of frequencies is insufficient for Bn in direct support of an Inf Regt having two (2) Bns in the assault. Three (3) frequencies per Bn is the minimum number that should be provided. This will allow one (1) frequency per assault Inf Bn and one (1) frequency for command purposes which can also be used for fire missions.

MEDICAL

Preparatory measures were made prior to embarkation as follows:

- (1) All vaccinations and immunizations, e.g., smallpox, typhoid, para-typhoid, tetanus, and yellow fever, were given and brought up to date.
- (2) Blankets and clothing were sprayed with Dimethylphthalate to kill the scrub typhus mites.
- (3) Dusting powder for individuals and in bulk was taken along for protection against vermin and insects.
- (4) Anti-Malaria measures, e.g., repellants, sprays, bombs, mosquito bars, and daily atabrine, were put into operation.

Combat medical packs and splint sets containing the essential components were hand carried for the assault. Medical chests, tentage, and other equipment were unloaded with the vehicles.

Medical Officers were included in the original reconnaissance for new positions in order to avoid confusion, complications, friction, and delay in setting up the station.

The 7th Inf Div Clearing Company, with its portable surgery, X-Ray, and laboratory, materially aided in caring for Arty units.

The 7th Inf Div Medical Supply, adequately furnished supplies throughout this operation. Items which were formerly difficult to obtain in the field, such as Tr. Merthiolate, Tr. Benzoin Compound, Paragoric, Amphojel, Creamalin, and Vitamins, were provided in sufficient amounts.

Otoscopes, battery type, are badly needed to facilitate examination and treatment of middle and external ear conditions which are becoming more and more prominent.

Preventive disease and protective health measures brought very noticeable results during this operation. Airplane spray of DDT Solution effectively killed flies and maintained low diarrhoeal incidence. Fresh vegetables were used but were soaked thirty (30) minutes, prior to cooking, in germicidal rinse.

Dermatological conditions have been minor problems here as compared to the LYTE Campaign.

No snake bites have been encountered.

An additional Dental Officer was attached for this operation. During the combat phase of this operation, dental patients were treated. Fillings, extractions, and miscellaneous treatments were handled.

Due to the isolated location of the 7th Div Arty Air Strip, an Aid Man was provided from the Medical Detachment to provide general supervision of health and sanitary measures and first aid to the Air Sections.

X. ENEMY ARTILLERY

The enemy continued his previously encountered tactics of using a single gun in a position. Only a few of these were placed in actual field positions. Guns were emplaced in caves from which they could fire or be wheeled out to provide a greater field of fire. Some guns were found in native shacks and camouflaged in courtyards of civilian homes.

It is difficult to determine whether or not the enemy ever used as much as a Btry volley to attack a target. The greatest number of rounds actually reported falling simultaneously was two (2) rounds. This does not mean that many rounds were not concentrated in single areas, but is possible that they were from widely spaced pieces previously adjusted or fired on some prearranged plan. An enemy Arty Officer stated that area fire was accomplished by sending to each gun or Btry the coordinates of the area to be attacked. The enemy fired concentrations as great as several hundred rounds during the period of greatest enemy Arty activity.

The enemy did fire observed fire on a number of occasions. They effectively attack our tanks and also high ground used for OPs with accurate fire. Although they possessed a number of two hundred (200) foot radio towers, that were potential OPs, P5W deny that they were used as such.

Wire was the primary means of communication but friendly shelling cut the wire three (3) or four (4) times each day so a small hand generated CW sending and receiving set was often used to transmit fire commands.

The enemy had check points approximately every five hundred (500) meters within the target area and often would wait until the target approached one of these before firing.

The enemy feared detection during daylight so only tanks, large numbers of vehicles, and many troops on a hill were attacked during daylight. Most of the firing was done at dawn or dusk and during the night. Enemy night harassing fire was recommended by observers who selected areas of unusual activity for surprise fire.

During the night the enemy fired into the front lines and rear areas and they made an effort to conduct counterbattery fire with some success. Two (2) friendly Bns that were in a position exposed to observation from CHINEN Peninsula were subjected to heavy shelling while those in defiladed areas received intermittent shelling not definitely attributed to the presence of the Arty.

XI. PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL STATISTICS

a. Personnel Casualties.

DATE	UNIT	KIA		WIA		IIA	
		OFF	EM	OFF	EM	OFF	EM
1 - 7 April 1945	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn			2			
	48th FA Bn				2		
	49th FA Bn				3		2
	57th FA Bn	1	1	1	2		1
	TOTAL	1	1	3	7		3

DATE	UNIT	KIA		WIA		IIA	
		OFF	EM	OFF	EM	OFF	EM
8 - 14 April 1945	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn	1			8		
	48th FA Bn		1		7		
	49th FA Bn		3	1	6		
	57th FA Bn		4	3	13		
15 - 21 April 1945	TOTAL	1	8	4	34		
	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn				1		
	48th FA Bn				3		1
	49th FA Bn	1		1	3		
22 - 28 April 1945	57th FA Bn			2	3		
	TOTAL	1		3	10		1
	Hq Btry Div Arty			2		5	
	31st FA Bn					4	
	48th FA Bn	1	1		3		1
29 Apr - 5 May 1945	49th FA Bn			1	4		
	57th FA Bn	1			7		1
	TOTAL	2	3	1	23		2
	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn					1	
6 - 12 May 1945	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn						1
	57th FA Bn			2		2	
	TOTAL			1	1	4	5
	Hq Btry Div Arty						
13- 19 May 1945	31st FA Bn					1	
	48th FA Bn						1
	49th FA Bn						1
	57th FA Bn						1
	TOTAL						2
20 - 26 May 1945	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn				1		
	48th FA Bn					1	1
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn	1		2			2
27 May - 2 June 1945	TOTAL	1		3	1		3
	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn					1	1
	48th FA Bn				1	1	
	49th FA Bn	1	2				
3 - 9 June 1945	57th FA Bn			1	1		
	TOTAL	1	2	2	3	1	2
	Hq Btry Div Arty						2
	31st FA Bn					1	
	48th FA Bn		1			3	
	49th FA Bn				1	4	
	57th FA Bn				1	4	
	TOTAL			1	1	8	2

DATE	UNIT	KIA		WIA		IIA	
		OFF	EM	OFF	EM	OFF	EM
10 - 16 June 1945	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn	1		8			
	49th FA Bn	1					
	57th FA Bn			3	7		
17 - 23 June 1945	TOTAL	1	1	8	3	3	7
	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn			2	2		
	49th FA Bn			1	2		1
24 - 30 June 1945	57th FA Bn					1	1
	TOTAL			3	5		2
	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn			1		1	1
	48th FA Bn					1	
TOTAL FOR CAMPAIGN	49th FA Bn			1	2		
	57th FA Bn					4	
	TOTAL			2		4	5
	Hq Btry Div Arty	0	2	0	5	0	2
	31st FA Bn	1	1	3	18	1	1
<u>TOTAL FOR CAMPAIGN</u>		48th FA Bn	1	4	3	32	0
		49th FA Bn	3	8	4	25	0
		57th FA Bn	3	7	11	34	3
		TOTAL	8	22	21	114	4
							34

b. Materiel Casualties.

	31st	48th	49th	57th	TOTAL
Sights replaced by Contact Team.	3	15	12	6	36
Sights replaced by Ord direct.	10	2	0	8	20
Undercarriage cracked & replaced by Btry personnel from damaged How.	0	0	0	0	0
Howitzers replaced direct by Ord.	2	2	1	3	8
Operating handles broken. Repaired by Contact Team.	1	2	0	5	8
Weak brakes. Repaired by Ord.	0	0	0	2	2
Locking ring, locking screw. Replaced by Contact Team.	0	0	0	0	0
Aiming post light. Replaced by Contact team.	0	2	6	1	9
Fuze wrenches worn out. Replaced by Contact Team.	4	0	3	14	21
Undercarriage, replaced by Ord.	0	0	0	8	8
Range Quadrants. Repaired by Ord.	0	0	0	0	0
Frozen Draw Bar. Repaired by Gun Mechanic.	0	0	0	2	2
Cracked Trail (junction of Axle & Trail). Repaired by Ord.	0	0	0	0	0
Panoramic Sights w/interior moisture. Repaired by Ord.	*2	0	0	0	*2
Elbow Telescope w/interior moisture. Repaired by Ord.	10	0	12	18	40
Recoil System. Repaired by Ord.	1	7	4	2	14
Equalizer support. Repaired by Ord.	0	0	1	0	1
Pintle Pin Bearing. Foreign material removed by Ord.	0	0	0	0	0

6-10-44

	31st	48th	49th	57th	TOTAL
Lunnette traveling locking lug latch. Replaced by Ord.	0	0	0	0	0
Trail Handspike. Repaired by Ord.	0	0	0	0	0
Traveling locking lug latch. Replaced by Ord.	0	0	0	0	0
Lanyards. Replaced by Gun Mech.	6	19	32	44	101
Shield. Straightened by Gun Mech.	0	0	0	0	0
Trigger Forks. Replaced by Gun Mechanics.	0	0	0	3	3
Sight Mounts. Replaced by Ord.	0	1	0	2	3
Firing Shaft Bracket Assembly replaced.	0	0	0	2	2
Howitzer Tube replaced by Ord.	0	5	3	14	22
Range Quadrant Mount replaced by Ord.	0	1	0	0	1
Safety Latch Plunger replaced by Ord.	2	0	0	0	2
Percussion Hammer Safety Lock. Replaced by Gun Mech.	2	0	0	0	2

*Grease

c. Ammunition Expenditures.

DAILY AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES, 155mm (31ST F.A. BN)

DATE	HE	WP	HC	WB	GB	M51	M54	M55	T-105	PRIMERS
April										
1-2	385	8	0	367	26	393	0	0	0	393
2-3	84	14	0	45	53	98	0	0	0	98
3-4	427	1	0	428	0	428	0	0	0	428
4-5	336	0	0	336	0	336	0	0	0	336
5-6	437	0	0	423	14	437	0	0	0	437
6-7	869	30	0	503	396	899	0	0	0	899
7-8	700	47	0	324	423	747	0	0	0	747
8-9	818	31	0	615	234	781	0	68	0	849
9-10	234	31	0	265	0	254	0	11	0	265
10-11	115	14	0	129	0	129	0	0	0	129
11-12	115	68	0	149	34	183	0	0	0	183
12-13	131	8	0	139	0	139	0	0	0	139
13-14	53	0	0	53	0	53	0	0	0	53
14-15	158	29	0	187	0	187	0	0	0	187
15-16	154	11	0	128	37	146	0	18	1	165
16-17	112	24	4	50	90	130	4	0	6	140
17-18	204	20	0	41	183	206	0	0	18	224
18-19	322	28	0	110	240	335	0	0	15	350
19-20	613	70	0	412	271	683	0	0	0	683
20-21	817	54	0	521	350	871	0	0	0	871
21-22	421	29	0	419	31	404	0	0	46	450
22-23	273	9	0	282	0	208	0	0	74	282
23-24	538	54	27	619	0	588	27	4	0	619
24-25	41	0	0	41	0	41	0	0	0	41
25-26	132	12	0	144	0	144	0	0	0	144
26-27	190	11	0	107	94	201	0	0	0	201
27-28	307	27	0	154	180	334	0	0	0	334
28-29	1204	45	5	810	444	1007	5	235	7	1254
29-30	670	46	5	392	329	633	5	83	0	721
30-1	750	31	12	599	194	709	12	47	25	793

DATE	HE	WP	HC	WB	GB	M51	M54	M55	105	T- PRIMERS
May										
1-2	516	29	0	453	92	497	0	0	48	545
2-3	382	18	0	192	208	390	0	6	4	400
3-4	773	17	1	567	224	690	1	91	9	791
4-5	752	26	1	676	103	545	1	180	53	779
5-6	594	4	0	417	181	490	0	108	0	598
6-7	527	6	0	456	77	443	0	60	30	533
7-8	901	16	4	749	172	873	4	35	9	921
8-9	291	7	0	250	48	278	0	20	0	298
9-10	684	57	0	609	132	707	0	30	0	741 (4 Fuze M67)
10-11	608	20	0	607	21	628	0	0	0	628
11-12	965	41	234	1005	235	1006	234	0	0	1240
12-13	691	104	576	1278	93	795	576	0	0	1371
13-14	682	12	0	561	133	694	0	0	0	694
14-15	368	112	116	341	255	480	116	0	0	596
15-16	413	11	0	387	37	421	0	3	0	424
16-17	508	3	0	475	36	511	0	0	0	511
17-18	205	5	0	210	0	210	0	0	0	210
18-19	277	14	5	207	89	258	5	33	0	296
19-20	501	31	2	533	1	510	2	22	0	534
20-21	640	24	2	610	56	632	2	32	0	666
21-22	631	11	0	643	0	631	1	11	0	643 (1)*
22-23	518	0	0	518	0	518	0	0	0	518
23-24	561	9	0	570	0	553	0	17	0	570
24-25	542	23	0	565	0	565	0	0	0	565
25-26	374	1	0	373	2	375	0	0	0	375
26-27	414	0	0	414	0	401	0	13	0	414
27-28	782	6	0	788	0	788	0	0	0	788
28-29	537	13	0	550	0	550	0	0	0	550
29-30	400	1	0	401	0	401	0	0	0	401
30-31	129	2	0	131	0	131	0	0	0	131
31-1	451	8	0	459	0	453	0	0	6	459
June										
1-2	216	86	0	302	0	302	0	0	0	302
2-3	175	40	0	203	12	215	0	0	0	215
3-4	142	41	0	177	6	183	0	0	0	183
4-5	181	2	0	183	0	183	0	0	0	183
5-6	274	4	0	278	0	278	0	0	0	278
6-7	178	38	0	216	0	216	0	0	0	216
7-8	484	53	0	537	0	537	0	0	0	537
8-9	973	6	0	961	18	979	0	0	0	979
9-10	719	11	0	729	1	730	0	0	0	730
10-11	716	0	0	716	0	716	0	0	0	716
11-12	450	1	0	172	279	451	0	0	0	451
12-13	159	0	0	8	151	159	0	0	0	159
13-14	298	0	0	0	298	298	0	0	0	298
14-15	312	0	0	146	166	312	0	0	0	312
15-16	434	5	0	254	185	439	0	0	0	439
16-17	483	3	0	355	131	406	0	80	0	486
17-18	246	1	26	93	180	247	26	0	0	273
18-19	531	4	0	268	267	535	0	0	0	535
19-20	671	0	0	502	169	671	0	0	0	671
20-21	372	0	0	356	16	367	0	5	0	372
21-22	129	0	0	4	125	129	0	0	0	129
22-23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
23-24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	36370	1678	1020	31247	7823	36481	1021	1212	351	39069

(Fuze M-67,
4)

*Illuminating Shell, M118.

DAILY AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES, 105mm

DATE	48TH FA				49TH FA				57TH FA				
	M48	M54	M57	M84	M48	M54	M57	M84	M48	M54	M57	M84	M67
April													
1-2	299	0	8	0	355	0	21	0	195	40	15	0	0
2-3	222	35	12	0	265	214	16	0	229	0	7	0	0
3-4	221	0	3	0	1312	0	17	0	227	55	7	0	0
4-5	372	0	17	0	484	133	80	0	1096	222	156	0	0
5-6	392	0	10	0	402	1	13	0	1304	71	41	0	0
6-7	597	0	6	0	1195	81	70	0	1594	190	124	0	0
7-8	551	70	46	0	1539	495	54	0	1831	412	159	0	0
8-9	561	356	48	0	780	221	81	0	1471	724	158	0	0
9-10	584	2	57	0	1383	217	114	0	1006	346	102	0	0
10-11	433	27	12	0	681	79	77	0	341	217	99	0	0
11-12	108	4	0	0	136	0	10	0	167	39	39	0	0
12-13	81	32	4	0	614	37	63	0	198	69	30	0	0
13-14	18	0	8	0	494	17	49	0	405	60	207	0	0
14-15	42	0	0	0	339	68	43	0	417	78	116	0	0
15-16	18	0	4	0	230	18	21	0	111	0	22	0	0
16-17	0	0	0	0	355	58	51	0	426	84	78	0	0
17-18	49	26	22	12	217	225	22	0	388	0	59	0	0
18-19	30	28	3	0	191	135	10	21	271	45	264	0	0
19-20	511	1243	450	0	1059	2174	72	0	1916	495	280	0	0
20-21	299	156	5	0	200	1186	27	0	1152	958	111	0	0
21-22	6	258	9	0	135	773	38	4	808	1308	147	0	0
22-23	0	0	0	0	320	171	9	5	596	798	37	0	0
23-24	79	8	4	0	672	158	36	2	752	456	292	0	19
24-25	0	0	0	0	409	464	4	0	671	170	155	0	0
25-26	2	6	5	0	641	250	49	0	601	63	115	0	0
26-27	8	31	4	0	84	157	13	0	735	145	46	0	15
27-28	59	34	8	0	326	328	55	0	932	331	145	0	0
28-29	6	14	1	0	1369	87	40	62	821	287	74	211	0
29-30	1021	195	45	0	513	184	31	0	926	378	40	63	96
May													
30-1	934	13	31	0	907	205	24	0	1298	423	19	263	56
1-2	413	47	11	0	1306	559	124	89	596	81	0	28	83
2-3	739	9	287	644	1907	84	30	4	819	82	7	61	4
3-4	1000	125	0	0	1343	371	29	0	1563	580	3	3	0
4-5	1085	386	1	1	1744	376	0	0	885	44	28	12	0
5-6	339	0	13	0	595	184	0	0	757	98	2	0	0
6-7	456	406	0	0	660	103	2	0	807	506	1	0	0
7-8	905	496	0	0	910	113	3	0	1312	279	2	0	0
8-9	377	68	0	0	537	281	0	0	898	442	1	14	0
9-10	338	161	3	0	1091	678	2	0	869	442	7	16	0
10-11	808	8	22	0	434	448	0	0	624	197	44	0	0
11-12	544	277	27	0	330	92	89	0	2060	762	1	42	0
12-13	1584	5	80	15	1250	241	12	0	1406	262	8	4	0
13-14	633	6	396	23	822	98	12	0	789	157	82	35	0
14-15	707	8	3	12	939	232	33	0	1152	211	2	2	0
15-16	1029	218	0	11	853	55	26	0	472	765	7	148	0
16-17	126	1485	0	51	736	192	7	0	322	1068	121	15	0
17-18	408	354	0	55	104	60	4	0	90	864	41	0	0
18-19	335	166	0	0	127	216	19	0	171	733	3	7	0
19-20	647	22	2	0	246	437	11	0	312	517	17	0	0
20-21	1364	80	0	0	193	374	38	0	353	158	6	12	0
21-22	1058	341	12	89	501	913	63	51	795	668	19	12	0
22-23	514	491	1	0	430	606	0	0	885	493	6	4	0
23-24	339	1407	12	0	685	637	1	0	565	937	43	0	0

SUMMARY

DATE	48TH FA				49TH FA				57TH FA				
	M48	M54	M57	M84	M48	M54	M57	M84	M48	M54	M57	M84	M67
24-25	90	1513	1	0	1444	1192	3	3	369	1629	2	0	0
25-26	0	1318	0	0	551	885	1	0	61	1375	7	0	0
26-27	0	487	0	0	163	328	3	0	183	707	0	2	0
27-28	159	591	3	0	769	182	48	61	378	42	13	0	0
28-29	81	304	2	0	828	128	7	0	1117	311	30	1	0
29-30	50	392	1	0	429	173	26	0	675	58	9	0	0
30-31	115	417	9	0	743	156	14	0	544	255	5	0	0
June													
31-1	493	185	5	0	331	647	14	0	1179	347	31	0	0
1-2	1044	600	313	0	263	30	61	0	748	670	177	11	0
2-3	489	0	35	0	222	13	19	0	809	231	176	0	0
3-4	649	0	93	0	36	44	7	0	444	80	60	0	0
4-5	516	0	50	0	57	0	3	0	408	0	157	0	0
5-6	277	0	131	0	511	7	3	0	661	133	133	129	0
6-7	488	26	0	0	94	0	0	0	1130	0	18	37	0
7-8	465	44	52	14	436	69	0	0	875	23	24	70	0
8-9	421	82	3	0	538	166	58	43	757	240	10	97	0
9-10	961	16	2	0	286	147	0	0	263	392	4	0	0
10-11	334	86	0	0	456	20	0	1	244	202	1	2	0
11-12	370	88	0	16	461	65	5	0	247	44	0	0	0
12-13	497	136	0	0	624	85	4	4	237	0	0	0	0
13-14	816	34	0	0	653	58	0	3	280	78	0	2	0
14-15	683	104	4	6	765	4	9	16	419	0	3	0	0
15-16	1174	204	0	1	1070	10	0	6	221	24	0	0	0
16-17	1150	0	0	0	586	52	1	1	683	0	0	0	0
17-18	485	0	0	25	565	61	4	22	275	0	2	24	0
18-19	732	78	0	2	536	8	1	0	324	0	0	0	0
19-20	1556	0	0	3	1200	117	2	0	870	98	0	0	0
20-21	357	0	1	0	655	18	1	0	324	0	0	0	0
21-22	0	0	0	0	270	0	0	0	47	0	0	0	0
22-23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	240	0	0	0	0
TOTAL													
BY BN	37633	15809	2397	980	50802	20121	2009	398	56399	25749	4457	1315	273

AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE BY TYPE

155mm Howitzer Ammunition

	31st FA Bn	Percent
Shell HE M107 w/Fuze M51A3	34,803	89.1
Shell HE M107 w/Fuze M55A1	1,212	3.1
Shell HE M107 w/Fuze T105	351	0.9
Shell Smoke WP M110 w/Fuze M51A3	1,678	4.3
Shell Smoke HC M116 w/Fuze M54	1,020	2.6
Shell Illuminating, M118	1	—
Shell HE M107 w/Fuze M67	4	—
TOTAL	39,069	100.0
Green Bag Powder Charge	7,822	20
White Bag Powder Charge	31,247	80
TOTAL	39,069	100

Average Daily Expenditure: 482 Rounds per day
155mm Ammunition 0.68 Units of fire per 155mm Howitzer

~~SECRET~~

105mm Howitzer Ammunition

	48TH FA	49TH FA	57TH FA	TOTAL	PERCENT
Shell HE M1 w/Fuze M48	37,633	50,802	56,399	144,834	66.2
Shell HE M1 w/Fuze M54	15,809	20,121	25,749	61,679	28.3
Shell HE AT M67 w/Fuze BDM62	0	0	273	273	0.1
Shell Smoke WP M60 w/Fuze M57	2,397	2,009	4,457	8,863	4.1
Shell Smoke BE M84 w/Fuze M54	980	398	1,315	2,693	1.3
TOTAL	56,819	73,330	88,193	218,342	100.0

Average Daily Expenditure: 2,669 Rounds per day
105mm Ammunition : 0.296 Units of fire per 105mm Howitzer

Total Ammunition Expenditure by 7th Inf Div Arty

31st FA Bn, 155mm How.	39,069
48th FA Bn, 105mm How.	56,819
49th FA Bn, 105mm How.	73,330
57th FA Bn, 105mm How.	<u>88,193</u>
TOTAL	257,411

XII. RECOMMENDATIONS.

It is recommended:

- (1) That all Arty Bns of Corps Arty be provided with an extra SCR 608 to provide direct communication with Div Arty FOs.
- (2) That the Div Air Officer be assigned to Div Arty Hq in order to better coordinate Air, Arty, and Naval Gunfire.
- (3) That in future amphibious operations, Aircraft Carriers be designated to provide Air Spot for Destroyers.
- (4) That each Arty Bn of Div Arty be issued ten (10) SCR 619s in lieu of a like number of SCR 609s for use of FOs and LnOs.
- (5) That additional training be provided Inf Regtl and Bn Cmdrs, and Arty Bn Cmdrs and LnOs in the planning of Arty supporting fires.
- (6) That this Div Arty be issued the new BG Scope, M-65.
- (7) That the T/O of Div Arty Hq Btry be increased by one (1) officer (Capt) and three (3) enlisted personnel to operate in the Target Information Center.
- (8) That photo coverage be reproduced in sufficient quantity to provide distribution down to and including Arty Bns.
- (9) That the T/O of the Div Arty Air Section be increased to include three (3) NCO Photo Technicians for the photographic section, and two (2) enlisted personnel for mess facilities.
- (10) That the T/E of the Div Arty Air Section be increased to include one (1) 1½-ton truck for mounting of photo laboratory.

(11) That all 3/4-ton trucks of the Div Arty be exchanged for a like number of 1½-ton trucks.

(12) That a line of demarkation, requiring loss of time due to wounds acquired in action, be specified prior to the awarding of the Purple Heart.

(13) That direct communication be established between adjacent direct support Arty Bns of adjacent Divs for better coordination of fires.

(14) That no unit enter an operation with any Howitzer that has fired in excess of 3000 rounds.

(15) That the T/O and E of the Div Arty Air Section be increased by two (2) L-5 Ln Airplanes and two (2) Pilots.

(16) That each Arty Bn be provided with 5000 sandbags initially.

(17) That each Arty Bn be provided with fifty (50) concertinas of barbed wire initially, and that the Engrs carry an additional supply.

(18) That the Engrs construct and issue an improved type of prefabricated kitchen tent frame and a latrine box.

(19) That each Arty Bn be issued a ten (10) cubic foot refrigerator, kerosene operated.

(20) That each Arty Bn be issued the Electric Lighting Set Number 4, with 5 Kilowatt Generator.

(21) That fifty percent (50%) of the present T/E .50 caliber machine guns be replaced with .30 caliber machine guns.

(22) That ten (10) caliber .30, M-1 rifles with grenade launcher be issued each Arty Bn in lieu of a like number of carbines.

(23) That five (5) caliber .45 sub-machine guns be issued to each Arty Btry.

(24) That Range Finders be eliminated from the T/E of Arty.

(25) That a twenty percent (20%) increase of night lights for aiming stakes be authorized the Arty.

(26) That greater care be given the segregation of Arty ammunition by lot number.

(27) That Arty gunners be issued raincoats in lieu of the Poncho.

(28) That each Arty Btry be issued a two hundred fifty (250) gallon water trailer.

(29) That each firing Btry be issued a light-proof tent.

(30) That each firing Btry be issued an extra burner for the Field Range, M-1937.

(31) That each individual be issued two (2) wool blankets, two (2) wool shirts, and one (1) field jacket for operations in a similar climate.

(32) That each individual be allowed a duffel bag.

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(33) That the SCR 284 be replaced with the SCR 694.


(34) That Div Arty Hq Btry and each Arty Bn be issued five (5) booster coils.

(35) That Div Arty Hq Btry be allocated two (2), and each Arty Bn be allocated three (3) SCR 600 series radio frequencies.

(36) That the following minimum list of vehicles be authorized the Field Artillery of an Infantry Division:

	Hq & Hq Btry Div Arty	105mm How Bn	155mm How Bn	Total for Div Arty
Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 4 x 4	10	20	12	82
Truck, $1\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6 x 6	8	10	10	48
Truck, $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6 x 6 LWB	3	10	8	41
Tractor, High-Speed, M-5	0	12	12	48
Tractor, D-7, w/Angle	0	4	4	16
Dozer				
Carrier, Cargo, M-29-C	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>28</u>
TOTAL	25	62	52	263
Trailer, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton	3	4	4	19
Trailer, 1-ton	9	5	5	29
Trailer, M-10	<u>0</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>48</u>
TOTAL	12	21	21	96
Truck, $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, Amph DUKW (Returned to DUKW Co when no longer needed)	2	15	3	50

(37) That the present authorized T/O of Field Artillery be increased by fifteen percent (15%).



L. J. STEWART
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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